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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic history shows repeated instances of “creative destruc-
tion” in which new technologies and business methods made compla-
cent firms and entire industries obsolete.1 The impact on their
workforces was profound.2 Labor markets adapted, of course, but this
occurred primarily through replacement of the existing labor force
with workers more attuned to the needs of new technologies and busi-
ness models. Sometimes existing workers found places for themselves
in the new technological environment through individual self-im-
provement efforts. At the margins, employers provided transition
training when it was economically efficient to do so, as in times of la-
bor shortage. In times of labor surplus, however, try as they might,
1. See infra Part II.
2. As Morse telegraphy was replaced by wired telephony and then by radio commu-
nication, the labor market for railroad telegraphers, once accommodating nearly
80,000 young men, collapsed. Jim Thompson, The Railroad Telegrapher, OZARKS
WATCH (Fall 1993/Winter 1994), https://thelibrary.org/lochist/periodicals/ozark-
swatch/ow702h.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/394X-F5LQ] (reporting 78,134 teleg-
raphers on all railroads in 1920). As railroads gradually squeezed out mule-
drawn canal barges in the nineteenth century, the labor market for canallers
evaporated. Instead, a complex labor market for rail workers grew, with features
reflecting the details of railroad operations, track work, maintenance of equip-
ment, supervision, and marketing. By the middle of the twentieth century, it in-
cluded 1.5 million workers. Now railroad employment is down to about 200,000.
U.S. Railroad Employment and Productivity Statistics, RAILSERVE, https://
www.railserve.com/employment.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2R4D-G286] (last
visited Dec. 19, 2019).
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state and federal governments could not do much to cushion the tran-
sition pain.
It turns out governments do not know how to fine-tune labor mar-
kets any more than they know how to steer and fine-tune product
markets or capital markets. In particular, the widely popular appren-
ticeship concept has a poor track record. Seemingly the only appren-
ticeships that work are those sponsored by craft unions, and those
work because they reflect the self-interest of the unions. These unions’
control over the apprenticeship programs gives them a powerful mech-
anism to control the labor supply. It appears the only government em-
ployment program that works is unemployment insurance (UI). It
works because it does not try to redefine labor markets; rather, it pro-
vides a temporary cushion, making it feasible for employees to seek
retraining on their own.
Government intervention in labor markets inevitably puts the gov-
ernment in the position of picking winners and losers. The market
does a much better job of that than democratically-elected public offi-
cials and their agency appointees, who are inevitably biased in favor of
interest groups representing the status quo and opposed to the new
technologies. Government sponsored retraining programs almost al-
ways reflect the future needs of employers poorly.
The Trump Administration has proposed to reform the apprentice-
ship system, allowing non-governmental entities, such as colleges and
industry groups, to certify “Industry-Recognized Apprenticeships,” as
an alternative to traditional government-defined and supervised “Reg-
istered Apprenticeships.”3 It remains to be seen whether the proposal
will be implemented and, if it is, whether it will be any more success-
ful than its predecessors. It provides few real incentives for employers
to participate.
Two hundred years ago, the law struggled to accommodate the
waves of transformative technology after the American Revolution,
when water-powered spinning frames and weaving looms replaced
home spinning and weaving and sent workers to factories instead of
households. Today the law struggles to accommodate the waves of
technology that substitute robots and computers networks for blue col-
lar work on manufacturing assembly lines and clerical work in offices.
Two hundred years ago, the factory was replacing the household as
the workplace; today the gig economy is replacing the factory.
This Article uses the textile and clothing industry—where the
American Industrial Revolution began—as a case study to explore ad-
justments of labor markets to changes in technology and in product
3. See infra section III.C.
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markets,4 while occasionally referring to other industries to reinforce
a proposition or to acknowledge a difference that might alter the anal-
ysis.5 The case study shows that government-supported and guided
training programs played little role in equipping new members of the
workforce for the industry and had little success in enabling existing
workers to adapt to change.
Creative destruction will continue. It will create many new jobs.
Some of the skills that workers already possess will be useful for the
new jobs, but some degree of adaptation and re-training will still be
necessary. This Article suggests that governments at any level are ill
equipped to oversee the re-training.
This Article begins, in Part II, by explaining the concept of creative
destruction, which is the engine of prosperity in all market economies.
Creative destruction inherently disrupts labor markets and makes the
skills of many existing workers obsolete. Part III analyzes the dismal
record of government-sponsored retraining programs in facilitating
worker adjustment. It explains why employer-sponsored training pro-
grams can be more effective but are largely absent during economic
downturns, when they are needed most.
Part IV recapitulates the history of the textile industry and shows
how labor markets adjusted to several waves of creative destruction.
It reviews the technologies that played leapfrog in the textile industry
from 1817 to 2017, each creating greater labor productivity.6 It ex-
plores the labor markets that connected workers with the machines
and focuses on specific adjustment mechanisms that allowed workers
to adapt to new technologies. Few of them were government
sponsored.
4. In terms of employment, the textile industry and the industries that process tex-
tile products, such as the apparel industry, were more important in the last dec-
ade of the twentieth century than automobile manufacturing, basic steel and
iron, and steel foundries. See Neil H. Rosenthal, Is the Middle Class Shrinking?,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 7 tbl.2 (May 1985), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1985/03/
art1full.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5BBF-AHSL] (showing total workers em-
ployed in 1983 in various industries, including 758,000 in motor vehicle manufac-
turing, 343,000 in blast furnace and basic steel products, 141,000 in iron and
steel foundries, 744,000 in textile mill products, and 1,164,000 in apparel and
other textile products).
5. “Sewbot” sewn T-shirts in Arkansas might be an example. See Adele Peters, This
T-Shirt Sewing Robot Could Radically Shift the Apparel Industry, FASTCOMPANY
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40454692/this-t-shirt-sewing-
robot-could-radically-shift-the-apparel-industry [https://perma.unl.edu/HPN7-
TCYD] (reporting on “Sewbot”––which was developed at Georgia Tech and in-
stalled in an Arkansas mill, and is capable of making 1.2 million T-shirts per
year––and explaining potential difficulties that could arise by automating the
sewing process).
6. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 100TH CONG., S. REP. ON THE U.S. TEXTILE AND
APPAREL INDUS. 57 (1987) (“In each 70-year period since 1760, productivity in
yarn and fabric formation increased tenfold.”).
2020] JOB TRAINING MYTHOLOGIES 799
This Article then shifts its focus to the future, projecting the course
of further technological disruption and exploring what public policy
should do about it. It concentrates on reshaping the unemployment
compensation system to encourage worker mobility, strengthening
worker training programs that combine classroom instruction with
on-the job experience, and considers the possibility of reforming for
profit trade schools to provide some of the training. It recommends a
fundamental restructuring of the Labor Department’s apprenticeship
program, if it is to be continued at all.
II. CREATIVE DESTRUCTION
Creative destruction is the engine of progress in a market econ-
omy, but the labor market adjustments it requires are painful. Joseph
M. Schumpeter explained how the process of creative destruction is a
byproduct of business cycles.7 Schumpeter’s qualitative explanation
dovetails nicely with the common understanding of Silicon Valley-fu-
eled innovation and bursting bubbles.
Within Schumpeter’s model, excess labor, capital, and other gener-
ally slack resources in business cycle troughs (recessions or depres-
sions) eventually attract the attention of a handful of entrepreneurial
leaders who have ideas for new combinations of factors of production.8
They begin innovating, and their success pulls other, slightly less tal-
ented, entrepreneurs into the field. Eventually, a “swarm” of entrepre-
neurs have entered the market and found growing demand for their
innovative products. This puts in motion a general “secondary wave”
of economic growth.9
The surge of entrepreneurial innovation almost always occurs
through new firms, alongside and at the expense of established
firms.10 Eventually, the law of diminishing returns means that the
marginal level of entrepreneurial talent is less, and the quality of
their innovation commands less excitement in the marketplace.11 The
success of the swarm throws many established firms into distress as
7. See JOSEPH M. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ch.VI,
212–55 (Redvers Opie trans., Transaction Publishers 2008) (1934).
8. Id. at 225 (explaining how the “swarm-like appearance of new enterprises”
forms).
9. Id. at 226 (explaining dynamics of a “secondary boom”).
10. Examples include Southern textile mills employing newer technologies than New
England mills; Tesla vis-a`-vis the established automobile companies; Spotify vis-
a-vis the traditional music labels; Netflix and Amazon movie and TV production
vis-a`-vis the traditional movie studios; and drone operators vis-a`-vis traditional
helicopter operators. In every case, the sponsor of the innovation is a new enter-
prise, just entering the market, not a legacy enterprise.
11. SCHUMPETER, supra note 7, at 228 (explaining role of diminishing returns in the
talent of entrepreneurs).
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consumers switch their allegiances to new products and services.12
The business cycle reaches its peak and a decline into the next trough
begins. The exhaustion of entrepreneurial talent and generally soften-
ing economic conditions frighten off investors. The downturn and
eventual trough continue until the economy can adjust to the new nor-
mal, one in which the firms fueling the last wave of innovation
predominate and the old establishment sloughs off labor and capital
that must be absorbed elsewhere in the economy.13
Crises and depressions are necessary, in Schumpeter’s view, to
confer the benefits of innovation on society. He explains:
This economic system cannot do without the ultima ratio of the complete de-
struction of those existences which are irretrievably associated with the hope-
lessly unadapted . . . . These changes are theoretically and practically,
economically and culturally, much more important than the economic stability
upon which all analytical attention has been concentrated for so long.14
Capital, labor, and land still exist, of course, in their old forms, but
they must be adapted to the new uses.
The waves in the business cycle do not lift all boats at the same
time or to the same height. As the waves run out, not all boats drop at
the same rate or as far. When the economy expands, some enterprises
are perfectly positioned because they have already gone through start-
up transitions and have established a foothold in the market. Uber
and Lyft are examples.15 Others are on the point of extinction and
gain a few more months or years by the upswing. Similarly, when a
recession starts, some enterprises fail almost immediately because
they were already on life support before the preceding boom tempora-
rily saved them. Others have thought they were doing well, but then
realize that more innovative competitors have stolen a march on them
from which they may not be able to recover.
As Schumpeter points out, incumbency is a disadvantage in the
creative destruction process. Incumbent firms have sunk capital in
machinery and a trained workforce. They want this capital to live out
its economic life rather than being scrapped in favor of the latest tech-
nology. That means that they are not going to be first movers in inno-
12. Id. at 232 (noting effect on established businesses).
13. Id. at 236 (referring to processes of resorption and liquidation that necessarily
occur in a “crisis”). See also Clark Nardinelli, Technology and Unemployment:
The Case of the Handloom Weavers, 53 S. ECON. J. 87, 88 (1986) (arguing that
unemployment of British handloom weavers in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was cyclical and not structural, due to mechanization).
14. SCHUMPETER, supra note 7, at 253–55 (referring to “burdens the economic system
with the unadapted and with those firms which are unfit to live”). One thinks of
downturns that facilitated the exit of Blockbusters, Borders, JCPenney, and
Sears.
15. See generally Ippei Takahashi, Lyft Has Been Around Longer Than Uber. History
Lesson., RIDEGURU (Apr. 2018), https://ride.guru/lounge/p/lyft-has-been-around-
longer-than-uber-history-lesson [https://perma.unl.edu/Z5VL-BKNF].
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vating. Also, the inevitable conflicts in economic interests likely have
hardened over time into regulations and employment arrangements,
including collectively bargained terms that increase costs and reduce
labor market flexibility. Capitalists investing in a new location where
the activity has not been conducted before can build greenfield plants
with the latest technology, start on a clean legislative and regulatory
slate, and recruit a workforce that, from the perspective of the capital-
ist, does not have bad habits.
The adaptations, however, are not frictionless or painless. Iconic
economist David Ricardo16 commented in 1821 that while “an applica-
tion of machinery to any branch of production, as should have the ef-
fect of saving labour, was a general good,” it would be “accompanied
only with that portion of inconvenience which in most cases attends
the removal of capital and labour from one employment to another.”17
Ricardo’s “inconvenience” is manifest in the modern U.S. economy.18
Each wave of creative destruction requires adjustments in the
workforce. In many cases the innovations require less labor for the
same level of output, and the new machines do not require the same
level or breadth of skills in the workers who operate them. As produc-
tion technology changes, existing workers must be retrained to use the
new technology or new workers must be recruited and given basic fa-
miliarity with the new technology. Training is the inevitable compan-
ion of creative destruction.
III. THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT “ADJUSTMENT
ASSISTANCE”
As the Industrial Revolution gained momentum after the Civil
War, creative destruction stimulated demands that the government do
something about it. Sometimes the “reformers” demanding action
sought improved wages and working conditions for employees; some-
times they attacked large corporations because of their effects on mar-
kets; by the mid-twentieth century, they were demanding government
job retraining.
By and large, all levels of government in the United States have
refrained from trying to block innovation. Reversing the Industrial
Revolution and going back to the spinning wheel and hand loom is not
very alluring—once real analysis punctures romance. Rewinding the
Industrial Revolution is picturesque in the mouths of poets and ro-
16. Ricardo was a contemporary of Adam Smith and is the intellectual father of the
theory of comparative advantage.
17. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 269
(Prometheus Books 1996) (1821).
18. See Lori G. KIetzer, Job Displacement, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 119–20 (1998)
(reviewing research on job losses in manufacturing sector).
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mantic in the pens of storytellers, maybe, but it involves a life that not
many would want to lead.
Instead of trying to block change, governments have actively facili-
tated labor market adjustment. The obvious solution is training;19 yet
training programs sponsored by governments have had little impact
on facilitating labor market adjustment. Training is an important ad-
justment mechanism, but the market takes care of most of it, and
other institutions do not understand how to do it very well.
A. Components of Training
1. Elements of Training
Most people have had experiences with various kinds of training.
Almost everyone in the United States had multiple years of classroom
training in elementary school, junior high school, high school,20 and,
for many, college. Most people have also had experience with more
practical training, sometimes associated with a job, such as simulated
customer interactions for a marketing professional, mock arguments
for a young lawyer, or simply having a supervisor look over one’s
shoulder while one navigates the order menu screen in a McDonald’s
restaurant.
Apart from these job-related possibilities, hands-on training exper-
iences are pervasive for recreational activities: skiing, playing a musi-
cal instrument, learning to drive, or learning to fly. Here, the student
actually does the activity, while the coach or teacher observes and pro-
vides corrective feedback.
Job-oriented training spans a similar spectrum of training activi-
ties. Most training programs for work have two components: a techni-
cal skills component and a culture socialization component.
Depending on the skills of the trainees and the job requirements, the
balance between the two components of a good training program var-
ies. Most mill girls in 1820,21 for example, had relevant technical
19. A Google search for “definition of training” produces the following definition and
list of synonyms, apparently generated by Google itself: “Noun: the action of
teaching a person or animal a particular skill or type of behavior—teaching,
coaching, tutoring, tutelage, schooling, education, drilling.”
20. The General Education Development (GED) exam provides a reasonable proxy
for what high school graduates should have learned: mathematical reasoning, in-
cluding basic math, geometry, basic algebra, graphs and functions; language arts,
including reading for meaning, identifying and creating arguments, grammar
and language; social studies, including reading for meaning in social studies, an-
alyzing historical events and arguments in social studies, using numbers and
graphs in social studies; and science, including reading for meaning in science,
designing and interpreting science experiments using numbers and graphics in
science. Test Subjects, GED TESTING SERV., https://ged.com/about_test/
test_subjects/ [https://perma.unl.edu/3TA4-BX4G] (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
21. See infra section IV.A.
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skills—they had been exposed to spinning at home—but they had no
experience working in a mill with dozens of other girls. Accordingly,
development goals of the early mill system focused more on socializa-
tion for work; group membership for self-improvement components—
the lectures and the classes—aimed at fulfilling their desires for self-
actualization and their fathers’ desires to make them respectable
rather than fulfilling the short-term goals of actual work in the mill.22
Doffer boys in the same mills experienced even more informal training
and work practices. They had to work intensively for 15 or 20 minutes
of every hour and were free to play with their fellow doffer boys for the
rest of the hour.23 It wasn’t a horrible job, and it taught them to accept
work structured by the clock instead of by childish whim.24
Depending on the skills or knowledge to be imparted, classroom
instruction or practical training may be more effective. A textile engi-
neer could learn about the physics of shuttle motion by studying
Newtonian mechanics in the classroom. Tying a broken end on a spin-
ning mule, on the other hand, could be done confidently only after
practicing it many times on an actual spinning machine. In the
twenty-first century, learning computer programming requires actu-
ally writing programs and running them on digital computers. Knowl-
edge of computer science theory may be helpful but is not necessary.
Preparing people for jobs requiring practical skills appropriately fo-
cuses on practical training.
2. Tools for Training
Academic institutions can accomplish some types of practical train-
ing, such as where laboratories are proximate to classrooms. Apparel
makers could learn how to sew on sewing machines by using relatively
inexpensive and completely portable sewing machines owned by a
training school. A would-be computer programmer can write programs
and run them on inexpensive personal computers owned by a com-
puter training school. But other practical skills training requires large
immobile machines owned and operated by potential employers. A
mill girl had to go to the mill to get practice on a spinning throstle, and
the bobbin boy had to go to the mill to learn how to replenish the bob-
bins on a power loom.
Industrialization replaced home crafts, for which training took
place in the household, with large-scale machinery, for which training
could occur only in the mill. The Industrial Revolution largely rede-
22. See id. (describing Lowell’s program of training and education for mill girls).
23. See Emma Skeham, The Boys Used to Get Away with Murder!, in THE LAST  GEN-
ERATION: WORK AND LIFE IN THE TEXTILE MILLS OF LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS,
1910–1960, at 111 (Mary Blewett ed., 1990) [hereinafter THE LAST GENERATION]
(describing how “the boys got away with murder”).
24. See infra section IV.A (describing doffer boys in Lowell’s mill).
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fined practical training as on-the-job training (OJT) because that was
the only way it could occur meaningfully. OJT requires cooperation
and participation by the employer to make its machinery available for
training. OJT also requires a more experienced operator to perform a
training role, and the employer must free up one of its more senior
employees to perform that role.
3. Economics of Training
A trainee, no matter how eager and precocious, is not worth much
at the beginning. Only as she begins to acquire some skills can she
produce output that has economic value to the employer. Compensa-
tion practices for beginning mill girls reflected that reality. Usually,
they received no pay at all until their tutors told the foreman that they
were ready to attend their own spinners. Likewise, the doffer boys and
bobbin boys usually began informally in an unpaid status until they
learned how to do their jobs, which required little training beyond
promptness and attention to duties.
Compensation practices for trainees reflected the cyclicality of sup-
ply and demand. When labor markets were slack, many individuals
were willing to work for nothing while they got trained, with the ex-
pectation of a decent and reasonably secure job afterwards. When la-
bor markets were tight, employers often had to bid to obtain trainees,
but still paid them less than fully trained journeyman.
4. Institutions for Training
As trade unionism began to take root in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, unions were interested in OJT for two reasons.
First, they could control the labor supply and therefore bid up the
wage rate if they controlled the training. That was the craft union ap-
prenticeship model. Second, as collectively bargained wage levels be-
came more common, unions insisted that lower trainee wage rates not
undercut the standard rate for a journeyman. They needed to make
sure that employers did not replace the journeyman paid union scale
with lower paid employees by calling them “trainees.”
That presented employers, unions, and employees with a conun-
drum. Once a trainee was able to perform any kind of useful work, he
became a competitor of journeymen. If the trainee was paid less than
the journeyman, the employer had an incentive to substitute trainees
for journeymen. That was precisely the risk the unions were con-
cerned about. On the other hand, trainees were not as productive as
fully trained journeymen; otherwise they would not need training. Re-
quiring that trainees be paid at the journeyman scale presented em-
ployers with a disincentive to engage in training.
Offloading training responsibility to someone else—mainly public
and private schools—got everyone off the hook. Trainees received no
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pay while they were in training, and they did not perform work that
competed with work performed in the factories under collective bar-
gaining agreements.
Getting everyone off the hook in this way, however, eviscerated
practical job training. Shifting training responsibility to vocational
schools essentially eliminated OJT. In some cases, a vocational school
could acquire relevant machinery so that it could replicate the work-
place to some extent, and it could hire faculty that had experience in
the factories, but there was an inherent divide between the educa-
tional enterprise and the workplace.
That divide made it easy for a gap to develop and grow wider be-
tween the skills vocational schools taught and the skills the employers
wanted for their workforces. In some early cases—the Lowell Textile
School is a good example25—employers in the relevant labor market
were partners, co-venturers, and funders of the vocational school. But
that close relationship withered in most labor markets as the twenti-
eth century progressed.
The account of the four eras of textile industry development ex-
plains the evolution of structures for workforce training from the be-
ginning of the Industrial Revolution through the Great Depression in
the 1930s. Until the 1960s, Government was absent in retraining of
workers displaced by creative destruction.
The Great Depression focused public attention on the problem of
unemployment and spawned government employment programs such
as the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Works Progress Administra-
tion, the Public Works Administration, and the National Youth Ad-
ministration. It also spawned other programs to deal with the
hardships of unemployment and to facilitate reemployment in the pri-
vate sector, such as the United States Employment Service and state/
federal unemployment compensation. The first government involve-
ment under the Fitzgerald (Apprenticeship) Act of 193726 sought to
limit training rather than expand it. Only after the Second World War
did intellectual capital begin to develop suggesting that governments
play an active role in providing training directly or providing incen-
tives for labor market participants to do it. Concerned that unemploy-
ment would loom after the Second World War, the Congress enacted
the Employment Act of 1946, but “for over a decade, the purposes of
this Act were more symbolic than real.”27
25. See infra section IV.C.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 50 (2012).
27. Gladys Roth Kremen, MDTA: The Origins of the Manpower Development and
Training Act of 1962, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/
history/mono-mdtatext [https://perma.unl.edu/MS25-SHLT] (last visited Apr. 13,
2019).
806 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:795
By the beginning of the Kennedy Administration in 1961, unem-
ployment had risen to 5.7% and manufacturing workers had the high-
est rate of unemployment. The economics profession was beginning to
discover “structural unemployment,” pockets of unemployment result-
ing from a mismatch between workforce skills with skills demanded
by employers, owing to technological change. Economists concluded
that structural unemployment cannot be eliminated by
macroeconomic policies, no matter how aggressive. “Faced with famil-
ial responsibilities and community attachments, the majority of the
unemployed failed to join the migration to areas of greater job oppor-
tunity. Moreover, with the shift in activity from goods to services,
most unemployed workers did not have the skills necessary to take
advantage of expanding occupations.”28
The Labor Movement and a “National Manpower Council,” estab-
lished by the Ford Foundation, argued that the Federal Government
must take the initiative to meet the challenge of automation and the
threat of the Cold War.29 While most of the public discourse urged
action at the community level, Secretary of Labor Mitchell established
an Office of Manpower Administration by Secretarial Order No. 63, on
August 25, 1954. The Department of Labor (DOL) already had a Bu-
reau of Apprenticeship, an occupation research component within the
Bureau of Labor Statistic, and labor exchange functions of the U.S.
Employment Service. These were consolidated within the new Man-
power office.
Reformers characterized the apprenticeship program as needing a
breath of “fresh air into what is a somewhat congealed apprenticeship
structure.”30 Despite enthusiasm for reforming apprenticeship pro-
grams, no real concrete changes occurred.31 For example, President
Eisenhower twice vetoed bills that would have provided federal gov-
ernment aid, aimed in part at job training, to depressed areas. One of
the points of contention was opposition to providing unemployment
benefits to those in job training programs.
The AFL-CIO organized a march on Washington in 1959 to force
the Congress to act on jobs. New President John F. Kennedy re-
sponded, with textile industry unemployment in his home state of
Massachusetts in mind and galvanized by his campaigning in de-
pressed West Virginia. His Area Redevelopment Act focused on de-
pressed areas. A subsequent proposal, the “Vocational Retraining Act
of 1961 (S. 987), attempted to solve unemployment caused by automa-
tion or other technological change, the relocation of industry, shifts in
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Eli Ginzburg, Statement to Secretary Mitchell (July 14, 1955), in
NAT’L ARCHIVES, REC. OF THE OFF. OF THE SEC’Y OF LABOR).
31. Id.
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market demand, and other changes in the structure of the economy.”32
The bill received criticism for its emphasis on vocational education,
however.
Vocational education was under severe criticism for not meeting current eco-
nomic needs and relying on archaic methods, and President Kennedy had re-
cently called for a study on that subject. It appeared counterproductive to put
money and resources into a suspect structure. In any event, this group favored
OJT as more suitable for older workers than classroom training.33
A Labor Department committee appointed to review the matter
warned that any federal training program had to guard against discouraging
employers and unions from maintaining their own OJT functions, and might
even encourage further OJT work by providing a federally subsidized training
allowance. No training program could function without at least a 52 week sub-
sistence allowance, the subcommittee counseled. But it also raised the possi-
bility of allocating moving expenses for workers who migrated from labor
surplus areas to places of greater job opportunities.34
Educational lobbyists opposed the increased Labor Department
role. Most vocational education programs operated through the public
schools, and the interest groups were happy with the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare’s acceptance of the status quo. Organ-
ized Labor generally preferred an emphasis on macroeconomic policy
and feared that more Labor Department involvement might disrupt
established building trades apprenticeship programs. The resulting
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 became law on
March 15, 1962.35
The claim that government had a useful role to play proceeded
from three premises. First, the government already operated most
pre-university education programs. Housing vocational education in
the public schools required government involvement because govern-
ments controlled the content of public education programs.
Second, governments have been active since the Great Depression
in establishing labor standards that set various floors under the terms
of employment that employers may offer. Much OJT will not occur if
employers must meet those labor standards for trainees. Whether to
permit exceptions to labor standards for trainees is a governmental
function.
Third, since the Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962,36 governments have been active in providing subsidies to shape
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-415, 76 Stat.
23, 24 (1962).
36. Id. (finding that “the skills of many persons have been rendered obsolete by dislo-
cations in the economy arising from automation or other technological develop-
ments, foreign competition, relocation of industry, shifts in market demands, and
other changes in the structure of the economy; that Government leadership is
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educational outcomes, to facilitate labor market and product market
transitions and to alleviate poverty, which often coexists with struc-
tural unemployment. When legislatures and administrative agencies
focus on a new problem, providing a targeted subsidy is a relatively
easy way to seem to address it regardless of how well the problem and
its possible solutions are understood. And, of course, most everyone is
willing to receive a subsidy.
The result is a public policy mess in which a multiplicity of overlap-
ping programs with appealing names like “Job Corps,” “Youthbuild,”
and “Workforce Opportunity and Training Act” are underfunded and
ineffective. Study after study reveals their ineffectiveness in making
any material difference in facilitating adjustment to creative
destruction.37
5. Barriers to Private Sector Skills Training
An April 19, 2019 story in the Wall Street Journal reported that
most employers do not invest much in retraining employees for new
technologies and business methods.38 Rather, they prefer to lay off the
employees experienced with old methods and hire new employees who
have been trained for the new technologies. The story reported on a
number of large corporations who have established retraining pro-
grams and are experimenting with them. Notably, however, all of
these programs are aspirational. The reporters apparently could find
no success stories to report.
It is important to understand why this reluctance to engage in re-
training exists, even at the peak of a business cycle when labor
shortages are manifest. One possibility is that it costs more to assess
the existing skills of a current workforce than to apply uniform in-
structional templates to younger new entrants to the workforce who
can safely be assumed to know nothing about a particular industry. A
program that must begin by assessing existing employees on an indi-
necessary to insure that the benefits of automation do not become burdens of
widespread unemployment . . . .”).
37. Project Quest, in Texas, may be an exception. The program emphasizes retrain-
ing experienced workers for new opportunities. It coordinates training through
community colleges, while subsidizing living expenses and providing extensive
coaching on work ethic and personal budgeting. Longitudinal studies conducted
long after the program’s inception suggest that it provides lasting benefits. See
Nelson D. Schwartz, Job Training Can Change Lives. See How San Antonio Does
It., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/
economy/worker-training-project.html [https://perma.unl.edu/58M8-ZQ6Y].
38. Compare Lauren Webber, Why Companies Are Failing at Reskilling, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 19, 2019), on.wsj.com/2Vw56s6 [https://perma.unl.edu/6FCR-GJFM] with
Ezequiel Minaya, Companies Seek to Fill Skills Gap by Retraining Their Own
Workers, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2019), on.wsj.com/32NWcbn [https://
perma.unl.edu/NV2H-N6YE] (reporting that 45% of 3,500 employers surveyed in
2018 offer cross training to employees, up 6% since 2014).
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vidual basis and matching their skills with new jobs so that gaps can
be identified is a more sophisticated and individualized undertaking
than simply delivering a mass-produced curriculum designed around
a new business model. Vendors are lined up claiming to be able to do
the latter. Doing the former requires much deeper knowledge of ex-
isting workplace methods.
Wharton’s Peter Cappelli argues that the “skills gap” is, to a con-
siderable extent, illusory.39 Employers routinely inflate the skills re-
quired for job openings and underestimate the skills of members of the
workforce. The skills actually required to do a new job frequently are a
pretty good match to the skills that experienced workers already
have—or they can be molded to match the requirements with little
effort. An attendant in an automated weaving mill does not need to
know how to code in the programming language Python—let alone in
the language C++—in order to respond to computer touchscreen
images that are presented when an alarm sounds signaling a malfunc-
tion such as a broken thread or an inability to catch a thread to tie a
knot in it.
On the other hand, a significant part of the population lacks the
basic skills and motivation for taking advantage of work opportuni-
ties. A 1998 survey of the skills identified as a central by employers40
showed that 50% to 75% of the lower tiers of the workforce were weak
on such things as locating an intersection on a street map, locating
two features of information from a sports article, calculating postage
and fees for certified mail, locating and entering information on an
application for a social security card, interpreting instructions from an
appliance warranty, and calculating the total costs of a purchase from
an order form.41 These are not job-specific skills and there is no reason
to think that competence in these areas has improved since 1998. The
mostly public education system is discharging students into the
workforce who can’t read, write, or use a computer, many of whom
also lack a work ethic.42
Another possibility is that existing employees are willing to transi-
tion to new technologies and new job requirements only if they receive
an increase in compensation for doing so. At least, they are unwilling
to make the transition if it involves decreased compensation. Most em-
39. Wharton Magazine, Cappelli: Why Good People Can’t Get Jobs, WHARTON MAGA-
ZINE, https://magazine.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/summer-2012/cappelli-why-
good-people-cant-get-jobs/ [https://perma.unl.edu/397N-EY4A] (last visited Dec.
19, 2019).
40. Larry Mikulecky & Jamie R. Kirkley, Literacy Instruction for the 21st Century
Workplace, 73 PEABODY J. EDUC. 290 (1998).
41. Id. at 304–05.
42. See generally JOB START 101, http://www.jobstart101.org [https://perma.unl.edu/
F6D3-S7WV] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (displaying a video regarding acquisition
of practical job skills aimed at college students).
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ployees get paid more as they get older and gain experience. It is quite
likely, therefore, that new employees can be paid less than existing
employees.
A fourth possibility is that employers may believe that experienced
employees have lower morale and less enthusiasm for new ways of
doing business than fresh-faced youngsters. This is surely not an accu-
rate perception everywhere, but it has a factual basis. Most people
dislike change. To a worker comfortable for years doing essentially re-
petitive tasks, the prospect of having to uproot his work customs is not
a welcome proposal. While economic incentives might induce such a
worker to accept training for a new job, he may well bring with him
disgruntlement about the change and the people who forced it upon
him and nostalgia for the familiar. Griping and obstruction of new
methods is the likely result. Workers whose boredom threshold is
lower and who seek change because it is exciting generally have self-
selected out of the rank-and-file and been promoted to supervisory po-
sitions, planning positions, or to other positions requiring a greater
range of skills and a holistic understanding of the overall production
process. A new hire, in contrast, is more likely to be enthusiastic. He
will not have nostalgia for practices that never were part of his life.
“Happy” workplaces surely exist, where the existing workforce em-
braces change with enthusiasm and excitement. This is probably not
the norm, however, and one cannot transform a grumpy workplace
into a happy and enthusiastic one overnight, even as new technologies
and methods are introduced.
B. Weaknesses of Existing Programs
The current set of labor market institutions are not well-equipped
to consider the relationship between existing skills and new skills in
the context of actual economic conditions in particular industries and
regions, in conjunction with workers who ultimately make the deci-
sion whether to embark on any form of retraining to take advantage of
a specific job opportunity.43 For intermediaries, “agency costs” loom.44
Schools are disconnected from labor markets and do not necessarily
set training goals that match the needs of employers whose businesses
are growing. Schools also are subject to distractions and debate over
43. The problem is not limited to the United States. See also Reforming Vocational
Education: It’s Time to End the Exploitation of Vulnerable People, THE CONVERSA-
TION (Dec. 15, 2015), http://theconversation.com/reforming-vocational-education-
its-time-to-end-the-exploitation-of-vulnerable-people-51396 [https://
perma.unl.edu/KHN7-G7HX] (reporting that “Australia’s vocational education
sector is a mess,” and exploring the perverse incentives operating on for-profit
training entities).
44. Agency costs exist when an intermediary pursues his own interests instead of the
interests of two parties whose interaction he is supposed to facilitate.
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how strongly their purpose should be vocational education as opposed
to more exalted academic or self-realization goals, including college
preparation.
Community colleges, the public institutions best suited to provide
vocational training, are not very well-connected with the employer
community and are confused on whether their chief goal is to train the
workforce for available jobs or to prepare students with deficient high-
school-level skills for eventual transition to college. State and federal
apprenticeship agencies are prisoners of old goals to restrict appren-
ticeship programs to limit competition in labor markets rather than to
promote new kinds of more efficient and quicker training to serve the
new economy. The next subsection analyzes apprenticeship programs
in greater depth.
The Labor Department’s Trade Adjustment Assistance Program
dates from the Kennedy Administration’s 1962 program to liberalize
trade.45 The current version entitles qualified applicants to supple-
mental UI and generous training grants. Multiple analyses of the pro-
gram suggest that it is not effective in facilitating the movement of its
beneficiaries into good jobs.46 The Labor Department itself concluded,
“[T]he net benefits of the TAA program as it operated under the 2002
amendments were negative.”47
1. Janesville, WI: A Case Study
An account of creative destruction in Janesville, Wisconsin, after a
General Motors plant there closed, echoes the lament of the textile
interests more than fifty years earlier. Amy Goldstein’s Janesville48
chronicles the human reaction to the closure. She follows the post-clo-
sure lives of a dozen or so factory workers. Most of them clung to the
belief that the factories would eventually reopen, as they used up their
basic and supplemental unemployment benefits and their COBRA
health care coverage. Several took advantage of the generous financial
support for retraining that poured in after the plants closed and took
45. Howard Rosen, Trade Adjustment Assistance: The More We Change the More It
Stays the Same, C. FRED BERGSTEN AND THE WORLD ECON., PETERSON INST. FOR
INT’L ECON. 79–105 (Michael Mussa ed., 2006).
46. See Tom DiChristopher, Sizing up the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program,
CNBC (June 26, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/26/is-aid-to-trade-displaced
-workers-worth-the-cost.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2HRN-QNGA] (citing US-
DOL Mathematica and other studies).
47. RONALD D’AMICO & PETER Z. SCHOCHET, THE EVALUATION OF THE TRADE ADJUST-
MENT ASSISTANT PROGRAM: A SYNTHESIS OF MAJOR FINDINGS iv (2012), https://
www.mathematica.org/our-publications-and-findings/publications/the-evaluation
-of-the-trade-adjustment-assistance-program-a-synthesis-of-major-findings
[https://perma.unl.edu/T5P9-S635] (noting that the study was prepared for the
DOL).
48. AMY GOLDSTEIN, JANESVILLE: AN AMERICAN STORY (2017).
812 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:795
classes at the local technical college, which long had focused on voca-
tional training rather than on a more general community college cur-
riculum. In the story, several community and educational leaders
stand out for their focus and energy in trying to save their community.
But, for the most part, the workers themselves had only a dim un-
derstanding or interest in what other opportunities might be available
for them. They were frightened or ashamed by the prospect of going
back to school, and most of them dropped out of the training as soon as
a rumor of other automobile factory work began to circulate. They also
were firmly rooted to the location. Some eventually took jobs at some
distance, as their union agreement entitled them to do, but typically
did not move their families there. Their ties to parents and grandpar-
ents, athletic leagues, and social routines were just too strong.49
Janesville reports similar results for the laid-off auto workers who
attended training at Blackhawk Technical College. Only one-third of
the workers who began the program finished, and those that finished
had worse experiences in the job market than those who did not enroll
in the training at all—fewer jobs and lower wages.50
Part of the problem is that most training programs, at least when
they are offered by community colleges and similar institutions, as-
sume a level of academic preparation that is inconsistent with the
skills that enrollees actually have. For example, the Blackhawk Tech-
nical College instructors were surprised that few of their students
knew how to use personal computers—even how to turn them on.51
Many students dropped out when they learned that longhand assign-
ments would not be accepted.52
Virtually all training programs center around school-like exper-
iences, taking place in classrooms. Most of the people working in occu-
pations vulnerable to technological obsolescence self-selected out of
classroom education and training as soon as they could. Some did not
complete high school. Those that did complete high school decided not
to attend college. In many cases their engagement in high school was
the minimum necessary to graduate. Further classroom instruction is
not something they embrace. They are likely to be anxious and have
fragile motivation.53
Although it is not politically correct to focus on this characteristic,
some of them are not very bright. All the evidence suggests that in-
49. See generally id. at 75–81, 115–20.
50. Id. at 311–16.
51. Id. at 118 (reporting on difficulty with computers).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 78–81 (summarizing concerns of laid off workers enrolling at Blackhawk).
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nate intelligence is normally distributed in the population.54 Training
and education comes hard for those in the lower part of the distribu-
tion, and they naturally avoid it as much as they can. Effective train-
ing must provide a pathway for those antagonistic to traditional
schooling.
OJT and apprenticeship experiences not only make it easier for
older workers to be motivated, but also help couple training with em-
ployers who actually can put trained graduates into jobs. Unfortu-
nately, as the following subsection observes, the institutionalization of
“registered apprenticeships” at the federal and state levels inade-
quately serves the current needs of labor market adjustment.
2. Registered Apprenticeships Are Not the Answer
Apprenticeship never played as significant a role in the United
States as it had in England. In the early days of settlement, it was too
easy for apprentices to run off and seek their fortunes in the West, so
masters would be very interested in investing in them. Apprenticeship
played little role in the early industrialization of the textile industry,
with other means of training supplanting decentralized tutelage of ap-
prentices by masters.
The apprenticeship system, which addressed both the technical
and the sociological training components, had pretty well died out in
the United States by the 1860s. Few economic incentives existed to
replicate it.55 Apprenticeship existed through the remainder of the
nineteenth century mainly as a means for craft unions to exert control
over labor market entry and thus to limit the supply of labor and in-
crease their bargaining power with employers who used craft labor.
The general trend of industrialization, however, was away from tradi-
tional crafts and toward less differentiated factory labor, in which ap-
prenticeship never played a role.
In the mid-twentieth century, apprenticeship enjoyed a brief up-
surge in popular interest, but the trade union movement, public school
bureaucracies, and education interest groups mostly frustrated think-
tank and Kennedy Administration proposals to modernize and expand
it.56 In the twenty-first century, the advertised advantages of regis-
tered apprenticeships are modest in magnitude, and the bureaucratic
impediments to establishing them are large. The Labor Department’s
54. See Hanna Vock, Gaussian Distribution of Intelligence, IHVO (June 12, 2008),
http://www.ihvo.de/202/gaussian-distribution-of-intelligence/ [https://perma.unl.
edu/2CVQ-AYHD].
55. HOLMES BECKWITH, GERMAN INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 10–15 (1913). Competitive pressures discouraged employers from
assigning experienced employees to train less experienced ones, because that
would diminish the productivity of the experienced workers. Id. at 16–17.
56. See Kremen, supra note 27.
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apprenticeship program would more accurately be described as an
“apprenticeship prevention program” than an apprenticeship enabling
program.
The concept of apprenticeship is attractive because it purports to
link the classroom component of training with the practical compo-
nent, and it links the training program institutionally with the enti-
ties that will employ its graduates. For an apprenticeship to be
“registered” under federal law confers a variety of benefits on the par-
ticipants. Veterans benefits may be available;57 employers may be
able to pay lower wages than required by prevailing-wage or labor
standards requirements;58 federal student assistance may be availa-
ble;59 and many states provide tax credits or tuition assistance.60 Ap-
prentices may be paid less than the federal minimum wage under
“special certificates” issued by the Secretary of Labor, specifying the
permissible wage, and imposing such limitations as the Secretary de-
termines.61 Certificates are limited to registered apprenticeships.62
The apprenticeship idea, however, is frozen in the past. It is a pris-
oner of a combination of the social and economic arrangements of the
1800s and the concerns of trade unions in the 1930s about competition
from new entrants.63 The Labor Department itself concluded that the
57. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 3672, 3687 (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (approving courses for veter-
ans’ benefits).
58. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr. N.A. Inc., 519 U.S.
316 (1995) (holding that ERISA did not preempt state prevailing wage law that
allowed lower wages to registered apprentices, but not to other apprentices).
59. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1091, 1161(c) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
60. Many states provide tax credits and other incentives for apprentices and the pro-
grams that train them. See Office of Apprenticeship, Emp’t & Training Admin.,
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Learn About Tax Credits (Mar. 4, 2019), https://
www.doleta.gov/oa/taxcredits.cfm [https://perma.unl.edu/3J8P-GLZC] (state-by-
state summary of tax credits and tuition support). The state programs typically
are limited to registered apprenticeships approved by the DOL. See ALA. CODE
§§ 40-18-420–40-18-424 (2018).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2012). See generally 29 C.F.R. pt. 520 (2019) (DOL regulations
for apprenticeship special certificates).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 520.300 (2019) (defining “apprentice”).
63. The 1937 National Apprenticeship Act (also known as the Fitzgerald Act) re-
quired the Secretary of Labor to establish standards for “registered apprentice-
ship” programs. The goal was not so much to improve worker access to jobs as to
prevent employer exploitation of apprentices. ROBERT LERMAN ET AL., THE URBAN
INSTITUTE CENTER ON LABOR, HUMAN SERVICES, AND POPULATION, THE BENEFITS
AND CHALLENGES OF REGISTERED APPRENTICESHIP: THE SPONSORS’ PERSPECTIVE 5
(2009), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30416/411907-The-
Benefits-and-Challenges-of-Registered-Apprenticeship-The-Sponsors-Perspec
tive.PDF [https://perma.unl.edu/6H8Q-2Z6K] (characterizing the goal of govern-
ment participation). The Fitzgerald Act is only one paragraph long. It authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to formulate and promote “labor standards necessary to
safeguard the welfare of apprentices . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 50 (2012).
ERISA preempts state regulation of apprenticeship programs that are fi-
nanced through a separate fund, but not those that are funded with general em-
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Registered Apprenticeship (RA) program offers little benefit: “[I]t is
not certain that employers benefit from RA. . . . [S]ome employers
cease to participate when the financial incentive is no longer availa-
ble. This suggests that, for these employers, the incentives encouraged
participation beyond the level that would be directly beneficial with-
out incentives.”64
A 2012 study of the effectiveness of federal apprenticeship pro-
grams in ten states65 claimed to have found them cost-effective, but,
remarkably enough, did not examine costs and benefits to sponsoring
employers.66 It merely assumed that they must offer net benefits to
employers; otherwise they would not sponsor them.
In 2007, there were 465,000 registered apprentices in the United
States67 under programs administered directly by the federal govern-
ment in twenty-five states and administered by the states under fed-
eral standards in the other twenty-five states.68 That equated to 0.3%
of the labor force, and 6% of the unemployed.69
The majority of registered apprenticeships are in the building
trades,70 although apprenticeships in trucking, electrical power distri-
bution, and health care grew during the Great Recession and had be-
gun to grow before it.71 Of the registered apprenticeships, 26% had
ployer assets. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 327 (reversing court of appeals and
distinguishing two types of plans).
64. DEBBIE REED ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., AN EFFECTIVE ASSESS-
MENT AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF REGISTERED APPRENTICESHIP IN 10 STATES
12 (2012), https://wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullText_Documents/ETAOP_
2012_10.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/PNP4-P3NE].
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id. at 4–5 (explaining that “collecting information on benefits and costs for em-
ployers was outside the scope of our study”). The DOL had sponsored a separate
study of employer attitudes in 2007, however. See LERMAN ET AL., supra note 63.
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 5. See REED ET AL., supra note 64, at 57 (concluding that federal and state
programs are quite similar).
69. See LERMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 4 (noting the modest size of U.S. apprentice-
ship programs, compared with programs in Europe).
70. John Lonergan, ApprenticeshipUSA.com, http://www.apprenticeship-usa.com/
[https://perma.unl.edu/W93J-37GX] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019) (“Formal appren-
ticeship is most highly established in the Building Construction Industry”).
71. DEBBIE REED ET AL., supra note 64, at 21, Figure III.4 (showing increases from
2000 to 2010 for heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers, electrical power-line in-
stallers and repairers, childcare workers, home appliance repairers, and nursing
aides, orderlies and attendants, and decreases for all other occupations). “[T]he
number of registered programs in energy more than doubled from 1995 to 2003
and the number of programs in social services (e.g., child care) almost quadrupled
from 1995 to 2003. However, registered apprenticeship programs in health ser-
vices decreased slightly and information technology remained relatively flat over
the 1995–2003 period.” LERMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 7 (citation omitted). See
also id. at 13, tbl.4.1 (showing characteristics of programs by industry).
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union participation.72 The average age of apprentices was less than
30; only about 10% were over 40, although the numbers of older ap-
prentices increased during the Great Recession.73 Males who com-
pleted apprenticeship programs spent 3.6 years in the programs.
Those who dropped out spent 1.9 years. The hours spent in OJT far
exceeded the hours spent in “related technical instruction.”74
Features of apprenticeships necessary to serve training purposes
are difficult to disentangle from features necessary to protect union
interests in controlling the labor market and protecting a floor under
wage levels. Craft-union-sponsored apprenticeships in the middle and
second half of the nineteenth century were quite different from union-
sponsored apprenticeships of the twenty-first century. One obvious
and important difference is that they do not occur in family house-
holds; they are formally separate as they are spatially, and organiza-
tionally, somewhere between the workplace and the school. More
significantly the purpose of protecting union control of labor supply
and the wages of existing employers now predominate. The goal of
providing a pathway into desirable jobs has been eclipsed.
Talk about apprenticeship greatly outruns action. The Obama Ad-
ministration unveiled an “ApprenticeshipUSA” initiative in 2016 with
great fanfare,75 although apprenticeship was only number three on
the list of job creation initiatives recommended by the vice president’s
Job-Driven Training review.76 Earlier, in 2001, the Labor Department
72. LERMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 12.
73. DEBBIE REED ET AL., supra note 64, at 19, Figure III.3 (showing increase from
2000 to 2010 in relative participation by those over 40).
74. Id. at 24 (analyzing the length of time spent by completers and dropouts).
75. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Investing $90 Million Through Appren-
ticeshipUSA to Expand Proven Pathways into the Middle Class (Apr. 21, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/21/fact-sheet-in
vesting-90-million-through-apprenticeshipusa-expand-proven [https://perma.
unl.edu/QR4L-X7YZ]; US Dep’t of Labor, Apprenticeship.gov, https://www.dol.
gov/featured/apprenticeship/ [https://perma.unl.edu/9EC9-QCTS] (last visited
Oct. 25, 2019). The list of apprenticeable occupations does not include anything
into which an unmanned aerial system remote pilot would fit. Available Occupa-
tions, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR EMP’T AND TRAINING ADMIN., https://www.doleta.gov/
OA/occupations.cfm [https://perma.unl.edu/B9MW-RUKT] (last visited Oct. 25,
2019). The toolkit contains links to a number of moderately useful guides but
does not allow registration or application online. The link to Illinois provides only
a postal address and email address to the regional DOL office and does not pro-
vide a link to a website for registration. See State Offices of Apprenticeship, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR EMP’T AND TRAINING ADMIN., https://www.doleta.gov/oa/stateof-
fices.cfm#IL [https://perma.unl.edu/TCF5-AK64] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). The
author sent an email to the listed email address on September 3, 2017 asking for
assistance in setting up a registered apprenticeship program.
76. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Progress Up-
date  on Job Driven Training and Apprenticeships (Apr. 21, 2016), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/job-driven_training_and_appren
ticeship_progress_report.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/XGK4-ZMNJ].
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launched the Advancing Apprenticeship Initiative (AAI) to develop
more apprenticeship programs in growth industries such as nursing,
information technology, geospatial technology, advanced manufactur-
ing, and maritime occupations.77 The Trump Administration includes
apprenticeship training as one of the initiatives of Jared Kushner’s
Office of American Innovation in the White House.78 A Google search
on January 8, 2018, however, found almost no references to the office
after March or June of 2017. Google searches for “Office of American
Innovation apprenticeship,” and on “Kushner apprenticeship” pro-
duces no hits except the article referenced above noting that the sub-
ject came up in the pre-Office-establishment discussions.79 So it
appears that the Trump administration, so far, is all talk and no ac-
tion, as well.
The Trump Administration has a website sponsored by the DOL,80
but it does not link to actual apprenticeship programs. The website
simply extols the virtues of apprenticeship and offers vaguely defined
coordination assistance to potential sponsors in the state and local
government sector and in the private sector. The ApprenticeshipUSA
website brags that the federal government allocated $90 million in FY
2016 to apprenticeships.81 That amount is less than 1% of the Labor
Department 2016 budget—hardly a major federal commitment.82
A search for Chicago apprenticeship programs produces a thin list
of specific employers. One might expect the level of interest in job re-
training programs to be highest in Rust Belt states like Michigan, Illi-
nois, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. State labor agencies in all
the states had websites, but a visit to the websites produces little in
terms of leads to actual opportunities.
77. LERMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 7. The Department’s website has a “toolkit” for
businesses wishing to establish a registered apprentice program. U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, A QUICK-START TOOLKIT: BUILDING REGISTERED APPRENTICESHIP PRO-
GRAMS, https://www.doleta.gov/oa/employers/apprenticeship_toolkit.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/H7UV-F2J2] (last visited Oct 23, 2019).
78. Presidential Memoranda, White House, Memorandum on the White House Office
of American Innovation (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/03/27/presidential-memorandum-white-house-office-american-innova-
tion [https://perma.unl.edu/VFE3-HTYD]. Matthew Nussbaum, Trump, Top Offi-
cials and CEOs Talk ‘Workforce of the Future,’ POLITICO (Feb.23, 2017, 12:23 PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/donald-trump-administration/2017/02/trump-ceos-
workplace-of-future-235309 [https://perma.unl.edu/7XDX-5S9E] (reporting that
one working group praised European-style apprenticeships in a conference that
led to the Office of American Innovations announcement).
79. See id.
80. Apprenticeship, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/apprenticeship/ [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/8EXU-SM7D] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
81. See Press Release, White House, supra note 76.
82. Department of Labor—FY 2016 Budget Fact Sheet, DEP’T OF LABOR, bit.ly/
2T9Vqlt [https://perma.unl.edu/SZ2A-LMMY] (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
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North Carolina is touted as having an unusually active and effec-
tive workforce training program, including apprenticeships involving
community colleges. A web search revealed a thin set of web re-
sources, referring mainly to North Carolina’s efforts to comply with
federal statutory mandates for training. The apprenticeship link had
no resources, required follow up through a contact with a state re-
source officer, and listed only a handful of occupations in the building
trades as examples of apprenticeships.83
Apprenticeship always suffered from a kind of schizophrenia. It
was, on the one hand, an excellent way to teach a neophyte a new set
of skills. On the other hand, it also was an excellent way to limit the
flow of new entrants into the labor market. When one sees apprentice-
ships two to four years or more in duration, one suspects that this
amount of time was considerably greater than necessary for skill ac-
quisition and acts only to restrict the supply of new journeymen. The
DOL programs reflect this schizophrenia. Their emphasis on stan-
dards, and the articulation of those standards, evidences an intent to
restrict apprenticeship programs, as much as to expand them.
The author tested the effectiveness of the existing apprenticeship
infrastructure by having one of his small businesses, Modovolate Avi-
ation, LLC (the LLC), apply for a registered apprenticeship program
to train remote pilots for unmanned aircraft systems—civilian drone
pilots. The LLC had already developed training materials for the rela-
tively new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) remote pilot certifi-
cate, which requires an examination on FAA rules. The LLC also had
put together a small network of qualified drone pilots to support drone
operating companies that lacked qualified drone pilots of their own to
fly their aircraft.
The author was frustrated at not being able to take the first steps
online but received a prompt response to his email inquiry to the re-
gional contact listed on the national DOL website. That led to another
email contact, followed by a telephone conversation with a regional
Employment and Training Administration (ETA) specialist. The ini-
tial barrier was that “remote pilot–small unmanned aircraft sys-
tem”—the official FAA terminology—did not appear as an
apprenticeable occupation. That might be because of the relative re-
cency of the FAA regulation. But there was no other occupation that
might cover it—no “helicopter pilot” or “remote camera operator.”
Also, the ETA specialist said that she had never heard of an appli-
cation being approved for an apprenticeship program that lasted less
83. See Apprenticeship Programs, N.C. DEP’T OF COM., http://nccommerce.com/
workforce/businesses/apprenticeship [https://perma.unl.edu/63QZ-UKSU] (last
visited Oct. 24, 2019).
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than one year; more often their duration is two to three years.84 In the
author’s experience,85 a year or more is grossly excessive for training a
drone pilot. A candidate can obtain proficiency in the necessary flying
skills in less than six weeks and achieve mastery of all the related
subject matter, electronics, economics, safety, and new applications in
six months. Requirements for longer duration may be appropriate
when the object is to restrict the flow of apprentices because they re-
present new competition in labor markets; shorter duration is appro-
priate if the object is to retrain laid off employees for new types of jobs
and to put them to work as quickly as possible.
The case for federal action to facilitate the creation or operation of
a partnership programs is thin:
[I]t is conceivable that we would find substantial effects of [registered appren-
ticeships] on earnings due to private apprenticeship programs even without
the government investment. Although there are reasons to believe that the
government investment contributes to the overall benefits of [registered ap-
prenticeships] through outreach to attract candidates and partners, technical
assistance to the sponsors, and quality assurance, the full benefit of the pro-
gram should not be attributed to the public investment.86
“Reforming” the DOL apprenticeship program is a dead end. Re-
forming it to perform what function? At present it functions as a kind
of gatekeeper to limit the number of registered apprenticeships. The
benefits of being a registered apprenticeship program are opaque.87 If
84. The DOL list of apprenticeable occupations lists no occupation with less than
2,000 hours required, and some require 8,000 to 10,000 hours. Available Occupa-
tions, supra note 75. Simple arithmetic shows that 2,000 hours is equivalent to
roughly a year of 40-hour weeks, and that 10,000 hours is equivalent to five
years.
85. See HENRY H. PERRITT, JR. & ELIOT O. SPRAGUE, DOMESTICATING DRONES: THE
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT (2017). The author is
a commercial helicopter and private instrument airplane pilot. His co-author is a
certificated helicopter flight instruction. Both are remote drone pilots.
86. REED ET AL., supra note 64, at 13; PAHL GUNN & LALITH DE SILVA, PH.D.,
PLANMATICS, INC., REGISTERED APPRENTICESHIP: FINDINGS FROM SITE VISITS TO
FIVE STATES (2008), bit.ly/39cUQZQ [https://perma.unl.edu/CDZ9-T26H].
87. The DOL website lists benefits. Apprenticeship: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/apprenticeship/toolkit/toolkitfaq.htm#2a
[https://perma.unl.edu/2VUV-F8K9] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). All of them are
available from any apprenticeship program, registered or not, except that “busi-
nesses may qualify for state tax credits available for apprenticeship program
sponsors. Workforce systems and other community partners may also choose to
contribute funding for training, supplies or other aspects of apprenticeship pro-
grams. These benefits reduce an employer’s investment in apprenticeship train-
ing costs.” Id. Only 12 states offer tax credits, and they are quite modest in
magnitude, ranging from either 30% of training costs at a community college or
$100 for private school training (Virginia), to 10% of apprentice wages, capped at
$1,000 (Alabama), to 50% of wages, capped at $4,800 (Rhode Island and Connecti-
cut). Learn About Tax Credits, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR EMP’T AND TRAINING ADMIN.
(Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.doleta.gov/oa/taxcredits.cfm [https://perma.unl.edu/
U46B-PX42]. The Connecticut credit is available only for apprenticeships lasting
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potential employers, existing employers, or intermediaries, such as
trade unions or educational institutions, have connections with young
people just entering the workforce, they can make their own bargains
to satisfy their own needs. Absent a system of large-scale governmen-
tal subsidies, it is not clear what the federal government has to add to
this.
Viewed objectively, the federal apprenticeship statutes and DOL
regulations are meant to discourage apprenticeships, not promote
them. It is no wonder that the evidence suggests government-ap-
proved apprenticeship programs are not very effective at facilitating
transition to work adjustment technologies. The bureaucratic and in-
terest group barriers to changing the existing program may be so
great that it is not worth bothering.
C. Labor Department Proposed Rule for Industry-
Recognized Apprenticeships
In 2019, the DOL proposed to restructure federally approved ap-
prenticeship programs by establishing a new pathway for certifying
them. It allows industry groups, profit-seeking and non-profit entities,
and education institutions to develop industry programs as an alter-
native pathway to traditional DOL registration.88 The proposal was
initiated by an industry-labor task force appointed by the President in
2017.89 Several members of the task force argued that “registered pro-
grams were too restrictive and included too much administrative red
tape, which has kept many companies from offering such formal work-
based training.”90
Under the proposal, Standards Recognition Entities (SREs) would
set industry consensus standards for apprenticeships.91 The DOL pro-
at least 4,000 hours. Manufacturing Apprenticeship Tax Credit, CONN. DEP’T OF
LABOR, http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/progsupt/appren/taxcr1.htm [https://
perma.unl.edu/UW2Y-A8HX] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
88. Apprenticeship Programs, Labor Standards for Registration, Amendment of Reg-
ulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 29970, 29972 (June 25, 2019) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
29) (summarizing proposal).
89. See Exec. Order No. 13,801, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,229 (June 15, 2017) (creating the
Task Force on Apprenticeship Expansion with representatives of business, labor,
educational institutions). The Task Force’s recommendations were transmitted to
the President on May 10, 2018. TASK FORCE ON APPRENTICESHIP EXPANSION, FI-
NAL REPORT TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (2018), https://www.dol.
gov/apprenticeship/docs/task-force-apprenticeship-expansion-report.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/W8ME-RYKF] [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
90. Building Trades Sounds Alarm on DOL Apprenticeship Proposal, NWLABORPRESS
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://nwlaborpress.org/2019/08/building-trades-sounds-alarm-
on-dol-apprenticeship-proposal/ [https://perma.unl.edu/JD6D-9UHT].
91. See Eric Morath, Apprentice Plans Face Retooling, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2019, at
A3 (noting that principal change is to allow programs to be run by business
groups, colleges, and other non-governmental entities).
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poses that it would only recognize SREs that seek to recognize indus-
try programs in sectors without significant registered apprenticeship
opportunities. It says that the new system should not undercut regis-
tered apprenticeships where they currently exist.92
The proposed rule creates a new “Industry-Recognized Apprentice-
ship Program” (IRAP) category, separate from the traditional regis-
tered apprenticeship.93 Such programs are those recognized by an
SRE.94 It sets minimum requirements that SREs must enforce, in-
cluding training that requires specialized knowledge and experience,
that involves the performance of complex tasks, and includes struc-
tured work experiences.95 The new apprenticeships would involve em-
ployment relationships,96 result in industry-recognized credentials,97
and include payment at least at the federal, state, or local minimum
wage.98
Section 29.25 of the proposed regulation provides for conversion of
a new industry-recognized apprenticeship into a registered appren-
ticeship, thereby entitling the program to the economic benefits asso-
ciated with the traditional apprenticeships.99 Organized labor has
criticized the proposal, defending existing arrangements in the con-
struction industry.100
Simultaneously with release of the Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, the Administration awarded $183.8 million in grants to fund pri-
vate-public apprenticeship partnerships at twenty-three institutions
to support training of 85,000 apprentices. The announcement
promises an additional $100 million for other efforts to expand ap-
prenticeships.101 The total amount of new funding is considerably
greater than the $90 million committed by the Obama
Administration.
92. Apprenticeship Programs, Labor Standards for Registration, Amendment Regu-
lations, 84 Fed. Reg. 29,970, 29,980 (June 25, 2019) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
29).
93. Id. at 30,012 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 29.20(b)).
94. Id.
95. Id. (to be codified at § 29.22(a)(4)(i)).
96. Id. (to be codified at § 29.22(a)(4)(ii)).
97. Id. (to be codified at § 29.22(a)(4)(iv)).
98. Id. (to be codified at § 29.22(a)(4)(vii)).
99. Id. at 29,977–78.
100. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Trump’s Watered-Down Ap-
prenticeship Program, UCOMMBLOG (July 22, 2019), https://ucommblog.com/sec-
tion/national-politics/trumps-watered-down-apprenticeship-program [https://
perma.unl.edu/KXJ3-N9XR] (posting by a union claiming that the proposal
“would let businesses run shoddy apprenticeships with minimal standards, over-
sight and pay”).
101. Press Release, Emp’t and Training Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department
of Labor Makes Major Announcements on Apprenticeship Expansion (June 24,
2019), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20190624 [https://perma.
unl.edu/A9LC-V45N].
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The Task Force noted difficulties in attracting young people to ap-
prenticeships102 and difficulties in persuading employers to partici-
pate in apprenticeship programs.103 The Task Force created a
Subcommittee on Attracting Business to Apprenticeship to provide
recommendations to incentivize employer participation.104 The recom-
mendations to overcome employer reluctance were vague, however, fo-
cusing on “streamlining” requirements and “centralizing
resources.”105
It is not clear why an employer would participate in an IRAP. State
and federal subsidies for registered apprenticeships would disappear,
as would the privilege of paying a subminimum wage. The incentives
for community colleges and other non-employer entities to establish
IRAPs presumably arise from the possibility of earning tuition income
from the new types of apprentices. Whether the graduates of these
new programs will obtain employment depends entirely on labor mar-
ket conditions. When labor markets are tight, graduates of IRAPs will
have attractive opportunities, but these opportunities will disappear
as labor markets become slack. Then, the usual evils of job-training
programs that overpromise and extract tuition revenue from unwit-
ting enrollees will appear.
IV. TEXTILE INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY
The history of the textile industry is very much America’s indus-
trial history. Schumpeter drew examples to support his model of crea-
tive destruction from the textile industry because it was the leader of
the Industrial Revolution.106 Integrated spinning and weaving mills
in Massachusetts and Rhode Island began the American Industrial
Revolution. After flourishing during the Civil War, the textile indus-
try and those who worked in it experienced shocks when production
moved to the American South in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century and the first quarter of the twentieth century. The shocks con-
tinued when the industry moved to Europe and Japan after World
War II, and then to less developed countries such as China, India, and
Bangladesh as the twenty-first century approached. The textile indus-
try was the first major industry to experience “deindustrialization.”107
When demand was growing, industrialists figured out how to train
workers so they could be productive. When demand was falling, em-
102. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 89, at 18–19.
103. Id. at 19.
104. See id. at 26.
105. Id. at 26–30.
106. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 7, at 129–33 (using water looms as an example of
the dynamics of innovation as prices of input factors and finished product adjust).
107. TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN, EMPTY MILLS: THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPORTS AND THE DE-
CLINE OF THE U.S. TEXTILE INDUSTRY 5–7 (2013).
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ployers lacked the necessary incentive, and governments could not fig-
ure out how to retrain workers to facilitate adjustment.
The following subsections consider technology, labor markets, and
adaptive means for four eras: the initial mechanization era; the
“speedup” and “stretch-out” era, in which immigrants became the
workforce; the “South rises again” era, in which production moved
South and used a sharecropper workforce; and the “Global” era, in
which production moved to Asia. Put differently, each section consid-
ers (1) creative, (2) destruction, and (3) adjustment. Disaggregating
200 years of industrial history into four discrete chronological eras is
not a perfect analytical exercise, of course. In most cases, the phenom-
ena identified with one era began in an earlier or extended to a later
one.
A. Mechanizing the Basics: Teaching in Surrogate Families
(1800–1840)
In the initial mechanization era, employers provided training and
education in communities of workers organized and supervised by the
employers.
Textile manufacturing involves four basic steps: harvesting the fi-
ber, transforming it into usable thread or yarn, making the cloth from
the yarn, and sewing and fabricating the garment from the cloth. Har-
vesting comprises picking cotton or shearing sheep and removing im-
purities from the aggregation of fiber that results. Producing yarn or
thread108 involves steps referred to in the aggregate as “spinning.”
Spinning includes cleaning, aligning, elongating, and twisting the fi-
ber. Manufactured fibers involve extruding filaments of material like
nylon, replacing some or all of the spinning steps. Turning the yarn
into cloth involves weaving or, alternatively, knitting. Fabricating
clothing apparel from the cloth involves sewing. Before the Industrial
Revolution each of these steps was a distinct process, performed by
different people in different places.
Mechanization of the cotton industry109 in the first decades of the
nineteenth century was the first step in the American Industrial
108. The terms “thread” and “yarn” are interchangeable; thread is used more com-
monly for smaller diameter yarn.
109. The cotton gin greatly influenced textile production’s shift from wool to cotton as
the Industrial Revolution took root in America. Eli Whitney’s invention improved
labor productivity by at least a factor of two. The popular notion that the cotton
gin revolutionized Southern agriculture in 1893 is misleading, however. Cotton
production thrived in the South even when workers handpicked the cotton seeds,
and earlier deseeding machines were in wide use before Whitney went to work.
Whitney’s prototype eliminated the existing technology’s shortcomings. More im-
portantly, the cotton gin made it feasible to gin upland, short staple cotton and
lowland, long staple cotton. Lowland cotton has large, black seeds to which the
fibers do not adhere tightly, making it easier to pick by hand than upland cotton.
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Revolution.110 Innovations in fiber-preparation, spinning, and weav-
ing technologies111 increased economies of scale, dramatically in-
creased labor productivity, and revolutionized the organization of
work. Mechanization of spinning came before mechanization of weav-
ing,112 and the earliest water-powered spinning mills produced yarn
for hand weavers who worked from home. The earliest factories in ru-
ral parts of New England concentrated on those tasks that were most
difficult for homeworkers to do: fulling113 and carding.114 The farmers
delivered their fleeces to the mill, and the mills returned roving which
the farmers used for hand spinning into yarn, which then was used to
create cloth on hand looms at home.115
Francis Cabot Lowell erected the first integrated spinning and
weaving mill in Waltham, Massachusetts in 1814.116 Locating spin-
Upland cotton has small, green seeds tightly bound to the fiber, taking it longer
to pick and making it considerably more difficult to process with existing machin-
ery. Lowland cotton grew on the fringes of the Gulf of Mexico and southern Atlan-
tic coasts; upland cotton grew everywhere else. See Charles S. Aiken, The
Evolution of Cotton Ginning in the Southeastern United States, 63 GEOGRAPHICAL
REV. 196, 196–99 (1973) (reviewing early efforts to mechanize seed picking from
upland and lowland cotton).
110. HANNAH JOSEPHSON, THE GOLDEN THREADS: NEW ENGLAND’S MILL GIRLS AND
MAGNATES 3–8 (1949) (describing international acclaim afforded New England
textile mills).
111. For spinning, the innovator’s goal was to increase the number of threads spun by
a single spinner. For weaving, the innovator’s goal was to raise and lower the
harnesses and throw the shuttle faster than a human weaver could. As a result,
Arkwright’s water frame and throstle differed from a hand spinning wheel, while
a power loom looked almost exactly like a hand loom. See HAROLD CATLING, THE
SPINNING MULE 13–51 (1970) (reporting early developments in spinning
technology).
Spinning and weaving are not the only activities in textile and apparel pro-
duction where technology advances enhance productivity. Fiber preparation
steps, such as cotton ginning to separate the cotton fiber from the seed and card-
ing to straighten fibers before they go into the spinning process, exhibited similar
phenomena as they were mechanized. New technologies increased labor produc-
tivity. Likewise, finishing steps, such as dying, experienced improvement.
112. THOMAS GRIES, ET AL., TEXTILE TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 5–8 (2d ed. 2015)
(summarizing the evolution of textile technology).
113. Fulling is the process of pounding on wool fleece so that its fibers “felt,” or become
more attached to each other. See SARA J. KADOLPH, TEXTILES 407, 347 (11th ed.
2010) (explaining “fulling,” “felting,” and their application in textile
manufacturing).
114. Carding is the process of aligning wool fibers with each other to make them spin
easier. See id. at 221.
115. Interview with John J. Colony, Chairman, Historic Harrisville, Inc. (Aug. 11,
2019).
116. Samuel Slater and his partners built spinning mills in Rhode Island before the
turn of the century, leaving weaving to handlooms, through a system of putting
out. See Barbara M. Tucker, The Merchant, the Manufacturer, and the Factory
Manager: The Case of Samuel Slater, 55 BUS. HIST. REV. 297, 299 (1981); GEORGE
S. WHITE, MEMOIR OF SAMUEL SLATER 41 (1836). Slater was twenty-two years old
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ning machinery, weaving machinery, and the machine shops to make
it under the same roof significantly reduced inventory and transporta-
tion costs. The Lowell revolution improved and integrated several
technological innovations that had preceded him.
Designing practical machines to perform spinning and weaving re-
quired adapting the steps previously done by hand. The purpose of the
three most basic steps comprising spinning is to take a roughly paral-
lel collection of fibers, reduce their diameter to that of thread or yarn
suitable for weaving or knitting (the drafting step), and then to twist
these smaller diameter fibers so they have tensile strength (the spin-
ning step).117 The inventive challenge in mechanizing spinning was
not the twisting function or the collection of the spun yarn on a bob-
bin. That already occurred on a hand spinning wheel in a manner that
only required the substitution of a nonhuman rotary motive force. The
challenges were in substituting machinery for the fingers of a spinner
to draft the fiber—to elongate it so that its density was reduced to a
relatively small number of individual fibers aligned with each other so
that they could be twisted to give them strength as a small-diameter
thread—and to increase the number of spindles that could be operated
simultaneously.118 The important productivity enhancing feature of
when Providence merchants William Almy and Smith Brown recruited him as a
mechanic to perfect their spinning machines. See WHITE, supra, at 41 (giving
dates); Tucker, supra, at 298–301 (describing the relationship among William
Almy, Smith Brown, Moses Brown, and Samuel Slater); Who Made America:
Francis Cabot Lowell, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/theymadeamerica/
whomade/lowell_hi.html [https://perma.unl.edu/GC7M-HY9R] (last visited Oct.
27, 2019).
117. Ring Frames, Cotton Mules, Twisters, Spoolers, Beam Warpers, Slashers, Chain
Warping, 77 INT’L LIBR. OF TECH. § 38, 2 (1906) (describing the three steps re-
quired in any spinning operation).
118. James Hargreaves invented a solution in 1764. He installed multiple spindles on
a movable frame, known as a “mule” or a “jenny.” C.A. Lawrence, Overview of
Developments in Yarn Spinning Technology, in ADVANCES IN YARN SPINNING
TECHNOLOGY 3, 9 (C.A. Lawrence ed., 2010). A typical nineteenth century mule
contained 1,320 spindles. William Strutt, son of Jedidiah Strutt, to whom Samuel
Slater was apprenticed, described the “spinning mule” thus:
Mules have been constructed, which do not require the manual aid of a
spinner, the mechanism being so contrived as to roll the spindle-carriage
out and in at the proper speed, without a hand touching it; and the only
manual labour employed in these machines, which are called ‘self-acting
mules,’ is that of the children who join the broken threads.
WHITE, supra note 116, at 46 (quoting letter from William Strutt).
Five years later, Richard Arkwright incorporated a different method of draft-
ing into his water frame: roller drafting patented by Lewis Paul in 1738. This
involved mounting two sets of rollers, with each set operating at different speeds.
As fibers from the roving passed from a pair of slower rotating rotors to a pair of
faster rotating ones, it would be stretched. The ratio of roller speed determined
the amount of draft. The only remaining problem was to gear the rollers to the
flyer and bobbin so that they rotated at appropriate speeds, to harness the whole
to a horse walking in a circle or to a water wheel, and to mount several of these
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the machinery was the ability to place multiple spindles on a single
frame operated by a spinner, not the speed of the spindles. A single
throstle frame could have 100 to 300 spindles,119 enabling the worker
operating it to spin 1,000% to 3,000% as much thread as a hand
spinner.120
Mechanizing weaving presented a greater challenge than mecha-
nizing spinning, although the individual steps performed by a hand
weaver were simpler than those performed by a hand spinner.121 The
weaving process involves more discrete steps than the spinning pro-
cess. First a weaver must dress or warp the loom by passing individ-
ual warp122 threads through heddles, eyes on strings or wires that
permit each thread to be raised or lowered separately from other
threads,123 and passing each through a dent (a narrow slot) in a reed,
which keeps the threads separate. Part of the dressing process re-
quires winding individual threads on a “warp beam” so that they can
move through the heddles without tangling as the weaving progresses.
The other ends of the warp threads are attached to a “cloth beam,”
onto which the cloth is wound as more of it is weaved.
After dressing the loom, the next step involves winding a bobbin of
weft124 thread and inserting it into a shuttle that passes between the
warp threads as the heddles are raised and lowered. The raising of
some warp threads while lowering other threads creates a “shed.” The
shed is the space between the raised and lowered threads. Plain weav-
units to a frame so that multiple bobbins of yarn could be spun simultaneously.
Roving is a rope of fiber in which the fibers have been combed to be nearly paral-
lel, making drafting feasible. Lawrence, supra, at 14–16.
119. See ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE, ROCKDALE: THE GROWTH OF AN AMERICAN VILLAGE
IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 140–42 (1978) (reporting numbers of spin-
dles on throstles and mules).
120. Id. at 143. The mills mechanized the spinning process first with wool and then
with cotton. Cotton presented greater challenges because of its shorter fibers. The
shorter fibers pull apart more easily, resulting in broken ends.
121. See id. at 144 (explaining that power looms duplicated the movements of hand
looms).
122. The warp is the collection of threads that run the long way (vertically) through
the fabric.
123. A series of heddles—maybe several hundred on a mechanical loom—is attached
to frames or harnesses—at least two, and as many as six or eight harnesses on
each loom. The harnesses, in turn, are attached to treadles or cams so that they
can be raised according to the intended structure of the weaving. Two harnesses
are sufficient for a plain weave of material like muslin or denim in long runs
because no pattern is woven into the cloth. United States Tariff Commission,
Loom Harness, Healds, and Collets, 10 TARIFF INFO. SURV. 59 (1925).
124. The weft is the collection of threads that run back and forth, horizontally,
through the cloth. Melvin T. Copeland, Technical Development in Cotton Manu-
facturing Since 1860, 24 Q.J. ECON. 109, 111–12 (1909) [hereinafter Cotton
Manufacturing].
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ing125 involves raising every other thread so that the weft thread
passes between them on one pass of the shuttle126 and then reversing
the positions of the threads as the shuttle passes back in the other
direction, thus trapping each weft thread between the warp
threads.127 The weaver then forces each new weft thread against the
preceding weft threads through an action called “beating.”128 The
power looms installed by Lowell applied waterpower to perform these
steps on an apparatus that looked much like a hand loom, but it had
specialized devices to perform each of the steps.
Workers had to be trained to operate the new machines, but the
economic and social environment mattered in determining what train-
ing was feasible. Apprenticeship129 never flourished in the Americas
as much as it did in England,130 where economic and social conditions
were quite different.131 Labor markets in America were tight. Open-
ing up the frontier took lots of male labor, and there was never
enough. There surely was no surplus to allow youngsters to spend five
or six years working as weaving apprentices. Persistent labor
shortages meant that farmers and craftsman were willing to hire al-
most anyone as a journeyman craftsman instead of insisting on a cre-
dential like a completed apprenticeship. These same labor shortages
ratcheted up opportunity costs for an apprentice who served out his
apprenticeship rather than leaving early for a better opportunity.132
125. Other structures, such as twill, may involve raising one thread, while the next
two are lowered then raising the next, lowering the next two, and so on. This
would be a one-to-two twill. BILLIE J. COLLIER, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TEXTILES
296 (7th ed. 2009).
126. Each pass of the shuttle is called a “pick.”
127. Each traverse by the shuttle, carrying the weft thread through the shed, was a
pick.
128. The position of the last beaten weft thread is called the fell of the cloth.
129. Apprenticeship was a bargained-for exchange. Its terms were defined, not by the
law, but by the apprenticeship agreement. Samuel Slater’s agreement with
Jedediah Strutt was typical.  Strutt was a partner of Richard Arkwright. See
WHITE, supra note 109, at 32–33 (reproducing apprenticeship indenture dated
Jan. 23, 1783).
130. Bernard Elbaum, Why Apprenticeship Persisted in Britain but Not in the United
States, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 337, 338, 343 (1989). The English system was codified in
the Statute of Artificers of 1563. See Donald Woodward, The Background to the
Statute of Artificers: The Genesis of Labour Policy, 1558–63, 33 ECON. HIST. REV.
32 (1980); Patrick Wallis, Apprenticeship and Training in Premodern England,
68 J. ECON. HIST. 832, 849–51 (2008) (explaining that masters were likely indif-
ferent about apprentices leaving their apprenticeship early because the training,
combined with the completion of menial tasks, was low cost and quickly profita-
ble for masters).
131. Elbaum, supra note 130, at 339 (summarizing labor conditions in America for
young workers).
132. The most serious problem with apprenticeship, from the master’s perspective,
was that an apprentice could get the benefits of training, while shirking the duty
to provide services in return by running away. See Wallis, supra note 130, at 833
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The chance to migrate westward was a pervasive and enduring temp-
tation. Once a runaway apprentice had left the state, it was almost
impossible to find him and force him to come back.133
Added to these clear economic and physical circumstances was the
revolutionary ideology of freedom and individual liberty. Being tied to
a master for multiple years as an apprentice was inconsistent with the
life of a free man.134
Francis Cabot Lowell’s mill system made seminal technology con-
tributions, but it also involved equally important labor market innova-
tions that provided a different context for training. He borrowed a
relatively unique idea from Scotland: recruit a workforce of young wo-
men from surrounding agricultural communities, build them pleasant
and secure housing, serve them good food, provide them opportunities
for church and education, and supervise their morals.135 Older girls
taught the younger girls the skills they needed, much as if they were a
family.
When these “mill girls” comprised the labor force, skills training
was not the responsibility of the mill but of the friends of the new girl.
The familial character of the workplace encouraged dormitory ma-
trons, more experienced girls, and overseers to take new girls under
their wings and teach them what they needed to know. The expecta-
tion was that a new girl would get her own spinning frame or loom in
about six months.136
(explaining and questioning conventional wisdom about rationality of running
away). Indentured servants were even more likely to run away than apprentices.
When an apprentice an away, he was forfeiting a certain amount of additional
training and a credential at the end of his apprenticeship. When an indentured
servant ran away, he lost nothing; he had already received his benefit. He only
deprived the lender of his continued service. The open West beckoned to both.
133. See generally Elbaum, supra note 130 (explaining why apprenticeship flourished
in Britain but failed in America). See also Indentured Servants and Apprentice
Records Master’s Index 1724–1850, CHESTER CTY. ARCHIVES AND REC. SERV.,
http://www.chesco.org/DocumentCenter/View/4132 [https://perma.unl.edu/TF72-
KWE2] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (displaying an index of legal actions involving
apprentices in Chester County, PA, that shows a significant number of claims
against apprentices for running away and a few claims by apprentices for “poor
conditions” or other breaches of contract).
134. See Elbaum, supra note 130, at 346 (referring to “ideology of personal liberty” as
a factor in discouraging apprenticeships in the U.S.).
135. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 110, at 8–9, 23–24 (describing arrangements for work-
ers and praise for them—the “factory girls”); see also id. at 69–71 (detailing the
mill’s housing layout and its applicable rules); CHAIM M. ROSENBERG, THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF FRANCIS CABOT LOWELL, 1775–1817, 250 (2011) (discussing recruit-
ment of factory girls and motivation of girls to work in the mills).
136. HARRIET ROBINSON, LOOM AND SPINDLE: OR, LIFE AMONG THE EARLY MILL GIRLS
42 (2011) (characterizing work in the mill as “a sort of manual training or indus-
trial school”); id. at 72 (noting the interest that overseers took in the girls).
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Before the supervisors would put her to work and pay her, someone
in the workforce had to vouch for and represent that she had trained
the newcomer. Pairing an experienced worker with a neophyte oc-
curred informally, not as part of a formal apprenticeship or other
training program. A handing-up girl inevitably watched the more
highly skilled drawing-in girl she was assisting. If the relationship
was cordial, the beginner would ask questions about the work and re-
ceive an answer.137
A contrasting “Rhode Island system” for staffing the mills re-
cruited entire families to leave the farm and come to work in the
mill.138 This was a logical recruiting concept because the family unit
on a farm was also a work unit. Farm families parceled out the tasks
in raising livestock, growing crops, feeding the household, and cloth-
ing the household to every member of the family, no matter how
young, according to each member’s abilities. The fathers and older
sons could operate the power looms, and the mothers and older daugh-
ters could superintend the spinning jennys. Additionally, the younger
children performed simple tasks under their parents’ direction, such
as doffing139 bobbins, tying broken threads, and cleaning the
machinery.
The mechanization of knitting140 occurred at roughly the same
time as the mechanization of spinning and weaving. By the beginning
137. Narcissa Fantini Hodges, I Knew My Job and I Knew My Place, in THE LAST
GENERATION, supra note 23, at 81, 82 (reporting the ease with which a friend
could be found to train a new employee; the company did not do it). “You go in,
ask for a job. The boss says, Okay, we’ll take her. Take her to this machine and
that machine and learn her how do it. That was it. I could sew at home. It helped
but it’s altogether different.” Lucie Cordeau, You Had to Be on Your Toes, All the
Time, in THE LAST GENERATION, supra note 23, at 73.
138. See Tucker, supra note 116 at 310 (noting Samuel Slater’s reliance on family la-
bor and quoting advertisement aimed at recruiting families).
139. ROBINSON, supra note 136, at 30 (describing life as a doffer).
140. Knitting is an alternative to weaving as a means of turning yarn into cloth. Knit-
ting existed in antiquity, and machines for improving knitting productivity were
invented as early as the sixteenth century. Some types of garments, such as socks
and stockings, always were knitted instead of being woven. History of Knitting,
MAKERS’ MERCANTILE, https://www.makersmercantile.com/history-of-knitting-a-
resource-guide.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/NW3E-TNMY] (last visited Oct. 25,
2019) (describing William Lee’s 1589 “stocking frame” and much earlier hand
knitting).
By one estimate, the demand for stockings in England in the seventeenth cen-
tury was 10 million pair per year. Men as well as women wore stockings because
the fashion was for men to wear short trousers or pantaloons. The same estimate
says that an experienced knitter could knit 6 pair per day. That means 1.6 mil-
lion knitter days were necessary to meet the annual demand. If one assumes an
average workweek of six days, that’s 266,000 knitter weeks, or about 13,300 hand
knitters to meet the demand. Queen Elizabeth I was right in her apprehension
that unrest would result from supporting William Lee’s sock-making machine be-
cause it might throw more than ten thousand people out of work.
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of the Civil War, there were large water powered knitting mills scat-
tered throughout New England. They integrated spinning and knit-
ting activities and were similar in scale to the integrated spinning and
weaving mills. Many of them also integrated the sewing operations
necessary to produce finished garments, although some outsourced
this finishing work to seamstresses working in their homes.
The populations from which knitting mill labor was drawn were
essentially the same populations that supplied labor for spinning and
weaving mills. Workers in knitting mills during the early parts of the
nineteenth century, like workers in spinning and weaving mills, lived
in dormitories and tenements erected and managed by the mills.
B. The Speedup and Stretchout—Rings and Draper Looms:
Informal Worker-Level Tutelage (1840–1880)
Two creative and destructive technological changes—ring spinning
and the Draper loom—defined the second era. These technologies
gradually grew to dominate the industry, and they enabled workers to
supervise substantially more machines and thus become more produc-
tive. The mill girls and other domestic workers drawn from the farms
were supplanted by waves of immigrants from Ireland, France, and,
towards the end of the period, southern and eastern Europe. In the
second period, employers began to distance themselves from organized
Weaving crisscrosses warp and weft yarn at right angles; knitting loops a sin-
gle length of yarn on itself. Like weaving, knitting produces satisfactory results
with any type of fiber, including wool, cotton, linen, and manufactured fibers. See
COLLIER, supra note 125, at 273, 321. At almost all levels of mechanization, knit-
ting resulted in higher capital and labor productivity because a knitting machine,
unlike a loom, did not require the time-consuming and intricate warping process.
In addition, knitting’s looping motions do not require the reciprocating motions of
a shuttle, with the speed-limiting effects of its inertia.
Knitting permits the integration of cloth manufacture with sewing the final
garment; the sock making machine not only knitted the fabric for the sock; it
made the actual sock in the appropriate shape at the same time. The resulting
cloth differs as between the two processes. Knits are inherently stretchable in all
directions; weaves are resistant to stretch except on the diagonal (the “bias”). The
different characteristics of the cloth make knits more attractive for some types of
clothing and weaves more attractive for other types. The inherent elasticity or
stretch of knits make them attractive for socks, stockings, underwear including
tee shirts, and other items of apparel that are intended to fit closely to the skin
and to take on the shape of different bodies. Weaves are preferred for clothing,
like formal suits and dresses and blouses that are intended to drape—and often
to conceal the actual shape of the body.
Weaves are inherently less dense—puffier—because of the larger amounts of
space in the interstices of the loops that comprise them. As inner garments, such
as sweaters worn under outer coats, they are excellent insulators. Their greater
porosity, however, makes them poor insulators in wind and precipitation when
they are the outer garment. See SARA J. KADOLPH, TEXTILES 312–20 (11th ed.
2010) (comparing knitting with weaving manufacturing processes and character-
istics of resulting cloth); see COLLIER, supra note 125, at 321–41 (same).
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training and socialization. Instead, employers relied more on informal
family and ethnic networks to recruit and train workers. Craft unions
began to involve themselves in formal training activities, but these
programs trained only higher skilled occupations such as loom fixers
and mule spinners. Mill owners provided fewer training, education,
and moral enlightenment opportunities. Training of the mill’s
workforce occurred informally through ethnic and family networks,
supplemented by a new institution: correspondence schools.
During this period, ring spinning displaced the spinning mule.141
Ring spinning’s capital productivity was 1.45 times the productivity of
mule spinning.142 Its labor productivity improvements were even
more dramatic: a single operative could oversee ten to sixteen frames
rather than five or six, and women and older children could do the
work, while men typically supervised mules.143
Draper looms increased weaving labor productivity by a factor
of three. The shuttle magazine technology of the Draper loom144 be-
gan to diffuse through the industry in the last decade of the nine-
teenth century.145 Draper looms required the stronger ring-spun
141. See FREDERICK H. ABERNATHY, ET AL., A STITCH IN TIME 187–88 (1999) (quoting
HERBERT J. LAHNE, THE COTTON MILL WORKER 153–56 (1944) (listing the move to
ring spinning as a key advance)). While the ring frame was more suitable for
coarser threads, the mule initially remained better for finer threads. A mule rep-
licated a human spinner’s movements. It drafted the fiber by expanding a frame,
stopped the frame while it spun the fiber, and then wound it up on cops. See
WALLACE, supra note 119, at 140–41 (explaining the spinning mule’s operation
and showing a diagram). A ring frame drafts by running the fiber through pairs
of rollers that are turning at different speeds. This process stretches the aligned
fibers and feeds the drafted fibers to rotors that revolve rapidly over spindles,
twisting the fibers as they are wrapped around the bobbins. The last part of the
process resembles the action of a flyer around the spindle of a hand spinning
wheel. See id. at 139–40 (explaining the throstle spinning frame’s operation—
essentially similar to ring spinning). The rings and rollers continuously spin
while the motion of the mule was reciprocating; the ring spinning frame’s design
was much simpler, reducing the cost and downtime for repairs. Cotton Manufac-
turing, supra note 124, at 123–25 (explaining functioning and identifying advan-
tages of ring spinning).
142. Timothy Leunig, New Answers to Old Questions: Explaining the Slow Adoption of
Ring Spinning in Lancashire, 1880–1913, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 439, 442 n.6, 462
(2001) (noting that the ring produces more output per hour but treats fibers more
harshly than a mule).
143. Cotton Manufacturing, supra note 124, at 122–32 (analyzing functions, advan-
tages, and disadvantages of mule spinning compared to ring spinning). See also
id. at 127 (noting that men were always employed as mule spinners, while wo-
men and children operated ring frames).
144. Terminology differs. “Automatic looms,” “Northrop looms,” and “Draper looms”
all refer to the same technology—a machine that equips looms with magazines
that automatically change bobbins in shuttles when the weft thread runs out.
145. Melvin T. Copeland, Progress of the Automatic Loom, 25 Q.J. ECON. 746, 746–47
(1911) [hereinafter Automatic Loom] (reporting the popularity of the Northrop
loom technology).
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yarn,146 so the migration to ring spinning complemented the migra-
tion to Draper looms.
Draper looms eliminated the need to stop each loom every seven to
eight minutes to replace the bobbin in the shuttle,147 and it used
mechanisms to detect broken threads automatically and to stop the
loom when it detected a broken thread. Draper looms permitted one
attendant to manage sixteen looms instead of only six under previous
technology148—a labor productivity increase of roughly 150%.149
The magnitude of technological revolution was far less dramatic in
apparel production than in textile manufacturing. Changes in apparel
production were chiefly limited to the replacement of hand sewing by
sewing machines after the invention of the sewing machine in about
1850.150
Meanwhile, product market changes were forcing changes in
workforce recruitment, training, and compensation.151 Gradually,
146. Leunig, supra note 142, at 442–43 tbl.1.
147. Automatic Loom, supra note 145, at 746 (noting that “a fresh bobbin must be
supplied every seven or eight minutes; hence stops are frequent.”). See George W.
Foster, Winding as Related to the Textile Industry, 43 MECH. ENG’G 595 (1921)
(estimating that 8-loom assignments stop 2240 times weekly; each stop requires
8–16 seconds to change the bobbin).
148. Automatic Loom, supra note 145, at 749 (reporting number of looms that could be
tended by one worker); Cotton Manufacturing, supra note 124, at 146 (estimating
that workers can tend 14 to 30 Northrop looms compared to 6 to 8 common
looms). By one estimate, automatic Draper or Northrop looms saved 100 stops per
day. Id. at 145. Mills could reduce labor costs by utilizing devices that detect
faults automatically, but these devices increase capital costs. For example, the
Draper automatic loom cost three times as much as a power loom, but it in-
creased labor productivity by a factor of 2 to 3. See id. at 144 (“[T]he number of
looms per weaver, and consequently the output per weaver, has become greater.
Weavers who formerly tended six to eight looms now tend from ten to fourteen.”);
Irwin Feller, The Diffusion and Location of Technological Change in the Ameri-
can Cotton-Textile Industry, 1890–1970, 15 TECH. & CULTURE 569, 573 (stating
higher cost of a Draper loom by a factor of three). United States’ labor costs were
higher than in Britain, thus American textile manufacturers undertook the capi-
tal investment with greater enthusiasm than their competitors in Britain. See
generally Cotton Manufacturing, supra note 124, at 147 (noting slower adoption
of Draper looms in the North than in the South because of capital cost).
149. After installation of bobbin magazines, a child could refill the magazine every
hour or so. See Letters from Susan: Letter Second, in THE LOWELL OFFERING:
WRITINGS BY NEW ENGLAND MILL WOMEN (1840–1845) 51 (Benita Eisler ed.,
1977) (explaining that girls in spinning room can “take charge of three of four
looms, instead of the one pair which is the allotment”).
150. Barthelemy Thimonnier, a French tailor invented the first practical machine in
1829. He was followed by Englishman John Fisher in 1844 and American Elias
Howe in 1845. Isaac Singer brought these inventions together in 1851 and won
various patent battles with them. See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S.
169, 171–73 (1896) (reviewing the history of sewing machine technology in claim
for trademark infringement).
151. JOSEPHSON, supra note 110, at 9–10 (remarking on dramatically worsened condi-
tions in thirty years). Because mechanization of spinning predated mechaniza-
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mill operators decreased the amount they were willing to spend on
food, lodging, education, and moral guidance.152 Chaperoning and
teaching the factory girls faded as the factory system spread and the
girls were replaced by immigrants.153 Continued downward pressure
on labor costs caused mill owners to look overseas for a future, more
pliable, workforce.154
The labor market proved resilient, however. The mill girls did not
want to be retrained for other jobs; they just left the labor force and
got married. Their desire to work in the more formal, faster, and more
ruthlessly efficient mills weakened, and they had their farms, fami-
tion of weaving by nearly a generation, yarn prices fell dramatically before cloth
prices. The result was a significant increase in profitability for weavers, who en-
joyed relatively stable prices and much lower factor costs. See C. Knick Harley,
Prices and Profits in Cotton Textiles During the Industrial Revolution, UNIV. OF
OXFORD DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY, NO. 81 (May
2010), http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/history/Paper81/harley81.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/752C-8C83] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (providing data on cotton
yarn and cotton cloth prices from late eighteenth century to 1830). By the 1830s
however, mechanization of weaving had spread, causing the price of cloth to de-
cline dramatically and squeezing the new entrants to weaving. Id.; see
SCHUMPETER, supra note 7, at 129–33 (using water looms as an example of dy-
namics of innovation as prices of input factors and finished product adjust).
152. ROBINSON, supra note 136, at 17 n.1 (reporting elimination of room and board fee
in the dormitories, which the mill owners originally had paid directly to the ma-
trons, but now shifted to the mill girls). The title of this section refers to speedups
and stretchouts. Requiring employees to work faster was a speedup. Requiring
them to tend more machines was a stretchout. Disentangling allegations of
speedups, stretchouts, and wage cuts is challenging. Nineteenth century employ-
ers regularly reduced wage rates when they fell on hard times. Such wage reduc-
tions were certainly a common provocation for strikes or unionization.
Overbuilding by investors, coupled with saturation of the market, put pressure
on prices and rewarded mill owners who found ways to cut costs by reducing the
quality of the lodging, food, and social experience they provided their workforce,
by increasing the pace of work and by occasionally cutting wages. JOSEPHSON,
supra note 110, at 74 (reporting on evolution of “rules” to involve longer hours,
larger number of machines per worker, increased pace, lower piece rates, and
insistence that the girls not protest or seek better conditions).
153. See Tucker, supra note 116, at 311 (noting that immigration of French-Canadian
and Irish textile mill workers eased labor shortages beginning in the late 1830s).
The mill girls were losing their enthusiasm, anyway. The factory girls organized
strikes in 1834 and 1836, astonishing almost everyone. See SUSAN CAMPBELL BAR-
TOLETTI, KIDS ON STRIKE! 17–19 (1999) (describing strikes that took thousands of
factory girls out for New England mills, but ultimately were unsuccessful). The
1834 factory girls strike protested a 15% wage reduction. Management imposed
the wage because of falling prices for product, occasioned by increased competi-
tion in the industry. See Nardinelli, supra note 13, at 91 (1986) (providing a table
showing cotton piece rates peaking in 1814 and declining to troughs in 1830 and
1841).
154. See LAURENCE F. GROSS, THE COURSE OF INDUSTRIAL DECLINE: THE BOOTT COT-
TON MILLS OF LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS 1835–1955 at 24 (1993) (providing a gen-
erally Marxist description of the gradual replacement of mill girls with
immigrants between 1836 and 1860).
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lies, and future husbands to go back to. The men continued to feel the
lure of the West and were happy to yield to it. Rapidly expanding mar-
kets dramatically expanded employment opportunities throughout
this period. Business cycles resulted in temporary layoffs, pressure to
increase efficiency, and engendered conflict, but, over the longer pe-
riod, labor shortages predominated. Replacement of native mill girls
by immigrants was gradual; there was no cataclysmic event in which
mills closed, threw all the girls out of work, and then reopened with
unwashed immigrants speaking broken English and a foreign lan-
guage. Immigration was modest after the Revolution until 1830, but it
accelerated thereafter, driven by unrest in Europe155 and U.S. labor
shortages during the Civil War.156
Immigrants often came to the mills as family units. Work would be
assigned to the family as a unit. Then, mills organized the family’s
productive activity as if the family were still at home, modified only as
necessary to accommodate factory schedules. The immigrants often
brought their families with them, and, as a result, mill-girl style hous-
ing provided by the mill did not work as well as it had for the girls.
The introduction of ring spinning, and its eventual dominance over
mule spinning, significantly changed gender roles in spinning rooms.
Mule spinning was universally men’s work because it was more dan-
155. Immigration from Great Britain and Ireland increased because labor surpluses
caused the British government to relax limits on emigration. The British Passen-
ger Vessels Act of 1803 roughly tripled the cost of ocean passage to North
America. The politics of its enactment make it clear that British landlords in-
tended the legislation to erect a barrier to tenants’ leaving their manors to go to
the United States. The Act erected a barrier to emigration. It was repealed in
1826. The Irish potato famine in 1845–1852 greatly accelerated immigration from
Ireland, which continued throughout the 1850s. This reinforced an initial wave of
immigration from continental Europe caused by the revolutions of 1848. See gen-
erally David Barratt, British Immigrants, IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES,
https://immigrationtounitedstates.org/393-british-immigrants.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/JH8J-6JWU] (last visted Dec. 19, 2019) (summarizing waves of
British immigration to U.S.); Peter Dunkley, Emigration and the State,
1803–1842: The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government Reconsidered, 23
HIST. J. 353, 357–66 (1980) (describing the history of the 1803 Act and its
aftermath).
156. Labor shortages during the Civil War caused Congress to enact the 1864 Act  to
Encourage Immigration, which encouraged potential employers to provide  incen-
tives for additional immigrants. Jason Silverman, Lincoln’s ‘Forgotten’ Act to En-
courage Immigration (Curtis Harris ed., July 1, 2016), http://www.lincolncottage.
org/lincolns-forgotten-act-to-encourage-immigration/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
NK55-W4GL] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (describing history of act). Abraham
Lincoln called for the legislation because of a “great deficiency of laborers in every
field of industry . . . .” Id. Representative Donnelly, supporting the resulting bill,
noted that private enterprise already had established “societies” in Boston and
elsewhere to encourage immigration. Id.
2020] JOB TRAINING MYTHOLOGIES 835
gerous and required strong legs.157 Ring spinning was simpler and
safer. All the operator had to do was to watch for broken threads or for
bobbin exhaustion. When men were assigned ring spinning machines,
they didn’t like the work.158 Finding it too simple and not manly
enough, they maneuvered to escape to a more desirable job as quickly
as possible. This attitude naturally led mule spinners, among the
more organized crafts, to discourage mills from upgrading their spin-
ning technology.
The locus of responsibility for training and education shifted dur-
ing the second era. Mule spinners worked in teams of two or three;
ring spinners worked alone, assisted by doffers who “belonged” to eve-
ryone.159 Mule spinning naturally provided an apprenticeship-like op-
portunity for little piecers and big piecers to gain skills that would
enable them to graduate to mule spinner positions. No such opportu-
nity accompanied the organization of work for ring spinners.
In the middle part of the century as an immigrant workforce re-
placed the mill girls, industrialists relied on immigrant families and
ethnic ties for informal training. A father, an uncle, a mother, an aunt,
or a sister would take a youngster under his or her wing and teach the
youngster the craft of operating a mule, a power loom, or a ring spin-
ner. In a few cases, the immigrants had already learned the craft in
Europe, and thus were ready to teach others. Sometimes, a foreman or
overseer would single out a promising youngster and suggest that he
157. Charles Costello, You Had to Go to Work Early and Get Some Money, in THE LAST
GENERATION, supra note 23, at 167 (“You had to have pretty good legs.”). “Good
legs” were necessary because the spinner walked in and out as the mule moved
on its rollers. Mule spinning involved a hierarchy of jobs that facilitated instruc-
tion. A mule spinner typically was assisted by three subordinates: a big piecer, a
little piecer, and a doffer. The big piecer typically was a young man between 16
and 21 years old, qualified to be a spinner, and just waiting for his own mule. The
little piecer was younger—typically about 16. The doffer was a young boy, often
below the age of 12. One started out as a sweeper, not usually assigned to a par-
ticular spinner, and then moved up the ranks to doffer, little piecer, big piecer,
and, finally, mule spinner. See also GROSS, supra note 154, at 62 (describing mule
spinning; because of the heat and humidity, mule spinners worked barechested
and barefoot, supervising helpers, piecers, and doffers); WALLACE, supra note 119,
at 143 (1978) (“All of the workers in the mule room were barefoot.”). Even before
widespread replacement of spinning mules with ring spinners, mill owners had
begun to replace the two piecers with just one backboy.
158. Costello, supra note 157, at 171 (“I just couldn’t handle it.”).
159. L.H.C. Tippett & P.D. Vincent, Statistical Investigations of Labour Productivity
in Cotton Spinning, 116 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 256, 263 (1953) (stating that “each
team of doffers serves several spinners” in the ring room, increasing productivity
of both spinners and doffers); William H. Lazonick, Production Relations, Labor
Productivity, and Choice of Technique: British and U.S. Cotton Spinning, 41 J.
ECON. HIST. 491, 500 (1981) (describing the roles of doffer and little piecer on
spinning mule); id. at 507 (reporting trends in employment of backboys and dof-
fers in spinning rooms); id. at 514–16 (describing incentives to replace spinning
mules with ring spinners).
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transfer to a more responsible position, but the training itself, and
much of the encouragement and motivation, took place entirely within
the lowest levels of the workforce.
As the mill girl system atrophied, mill owners began to delegate
the responsibility of educating workers. The rise of free public schools
invited employers, potential employees, and labor unions to back off
from conducting the training themselves because of the expectation
that the public school system would do it. Some of the strongest sup-
porters of free public education were industrial interests and labor un-
ions.160 Horace Mann, as president of the Massachusetts state senate
and before he became secretary of the state board of education, identi-
fied primarily with the promotion of railroads and industrializa-
tion.161 The push for free public education followed the support of it in
the earliest mill towns like Lowell. Tension had begun to grow over
who was going to pay for it—the mill owners or the newly incorpo-
rated towns.162 Immigration increased the need for public educa-
tion.163 Action by the Massachusetts legislature to establish a state
system of public education coincided with the strategy of replacing the
mill girls with immigrants. Public education was promoted as instil-
ling knowledge and discipline that would produce a good workforce.164
Outside New England, low population densities and low funding
for public schools meant that the schools were small and scattered.
Few could afford any formal vocational education. Where schools ex-
isted, basic literacy in reading, writing, and arithmetic was the extent
of the education provided. As the complexity of textile machinery
grew, would-be employees for the higher skilled jobs looked to corre-
spondence schools to provide the requisite knowledge.
160. See Frederick Dean McClustky, Introduction of Grading into the Public Schools
of New England, 21 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 34, 45–46 (1920) (reporting that Ed-
mund Dwight’s advocacy was key in persuading the Massachusetts legislature to
establish a state board of education and the first normal school and to hire Hor-
ace Mann in 1837). Dwight was treasurer of the Boston Manufacturing Company,
which Frances Cabot Lowell founded.
161. See generally Horace Mann Biography, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/
scholar/horace-mann [https://perma.unl.edu/SSJ6-XUP5] (last updated Apr. 16,
2019) (“During these years, Mann aimed his sights at infrastructure improve-
ments via the construction of railroads and canals, and established an asylum for
the insane at Worcester.”).
162. JOSEPHSON, supra note 110, at 52–53 (the alienation was increased by the ab-
sence of any business offices in Lowell).
163. Id. at 62 (noting that originally, the factory girls were of the same ethnicity and
nationality as the overseers and mills owners).
164. See Andrew Dawson, The Workshop and the Classroom: Philadelphia Engineer-
ing, the Decline of Apprenticeship, and the Rise of Industrial Training,
1878–1900, 39 HIST. EDUC. Q. 143, 144–45 (1999) (describing the move of training
from apprenticeship to public schools, motivated in part my concern about unrest
attributable to idle young men).
2020] JOB TRAINING MYTHOLOGIES 837
The West continued to beckon to those unhappy with their factory
life, although dependence of many immigrant workers on their immi-
grant mill communities made workers reluctant to relocate.
The claim by some commentators, such as Laurence F. Gross,165
that entrepreneurs consciously sought to reduce the skills required in
the mills in order to blunt labor organization is exaggerated and fu-
eled mainly by ideology. It was technology, not anti-labor sentiment in
the management class, that reduced and fragmented skill require-
ments. For example, the bobbin magazine reduced the need for doffers
and other spinning machinery attendants to dart back-and-forth to re-
move full bobbins from spinning frames and to replace them with
empty ones.166 The mill owners were glad to deploy the new technol-
ogy and to enjoy the lower labor costs that resulted, but their motiva-
tion was directly economic and not centered on subverting collective-
bargaining.
Training organized and run by the mill operators was never a fea-
ture of the industry after the mill girl system faded away.167 Not
much training was required for the unskilled jobs; a new worker could
show up and get some brief tutelage by a member of his family or eth-
nic group. The supervisor would say, “Stand here. When this has no
more thread on it call for a doffer boy.” When something else went
wrong, the operator simply raised a yellow stick to summon a loom
fixer.
The more highly skilled jobs required more formal training, but
this was left to the one who aspired to those jobs. He might attend
165. See GROSS, supra note 154, at 18 (1993) (interpreting developments as reflecting
desire by owners to subjugate labor). Gross is an Associate Professor at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts in Lowell and has been active as a curator of textile
museums.
166. See generally B. Pourdeyhimi et al., The Development of Weaving Using Auto-
matic Looms, 4 ARS TEXTRINA 107 (1985) (detailing the development of bobbin
magazines for power looms, which increased the number of looms that could be
supervised by one operator).
167. Mary H. Blewett, Introduction, in THE LAST GENERATION, supra note 23, at 148
(explaining that an ambitious doffer boy might persuade older operator to teach
him how to spin and might attend free night classes at Lowell Textile School).
Some type of formal training persisted in about half of the mills, but it was much
shorter in duration and much more focused on a narrow range of tasks immedi-
ately useful in the short run than under the apprenticeship system. BECKWITH,
supra note 55, at 18 (discussing roles of “helper” and “junior workmen”). And an
increasing number of employers did not train at all, assured that they could meet
their employment needs adequately from the fugitives from other employers’
training programs and from others looking to switch jobs. This set off a vicious
cycle, with more and more employers asking themselves, “Why should I incur the
expense of training for my competitors?” Id. at 20 (summarizing survey of 1118
New York employers, about half of which had trained their own workers).
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night classes or take correspondence courses.168 This training could
allow one holding a lower-level job to learn weaving or loom fixing.
Work skill was an obvious subject for conversation to pass the time
while their hands were working. A good deal of camaraderie existed
among the men working in a particular room.169 A more experienced
weaver might take an interest in a doffer boy who showed enthusiasm
and curiosity about the machinery and teach him some part of the
process, like how to tie a knot between a new warp thread and the
broken one.170 Family and ethnic connections mattered.171 When they
existed, skills might begin to be acquired around the dinner table172
and then be expanded in the mill.173
Craft unions operated at the margins, and industrial unions were
just beginning to organize.174 Craft unions were active only for a few
of the most highly skilled occupations, such as loom fixers. Where
craft unions were active in the labor market in New England, the un-
ions—like most craft unions—controlled the labor supply for their
crafts. By the end of the century, the unions were organizing schools
to provide necessary job-oriented training and to help match job va-
cancies with job applicants. For example, the Loom Fixers Union was
a leader in establishing textile schools in New England, and it con-
trolled entry to the school tightly.175
168. See supra subsection III.A.4. (describing the emergence of third-party training
institutions).
169. Blewett, supra note 167, at 148 (explaining how male camaraderie on the weav-
ing floor led youngsters to connect with older men who treated them like sons);
Costello, supra note 157, at 168 (“Some guy will take a liking to you, and you’ll
take a liking to a certain spinner.”).
170. Blewett, supra note 167, at 148 (noting that a weaver might teach a doffer boy
how to tie a knot).
171. Id. at 147 (stating young men without family connections had trouble escaping
unskilled doffer boy or sweeper positions).
172. Id. (noting that some boys could name the parts of a loom, learned around the
dinner table).
173. Id. (explaining how an aspiration for a youngster to acquire a skill was met by
fathers and brothers instructing in weaving, slashing, fixing).
174. Until the 1870s, the leaders of the American trade union movement were craft
unionists. See JULIE GREEN, PURE AND SIMPLE POLITICS: THE AMERICAN FEDERA-
TION OF LABOR AND POLITICAL ACTIVIST, 1881–1917 36–39 (1998) (reporting the
triumph of craft unionism over industrial unionism).
175. In 1898, the Loom Fixers Union, through its Textile School Committee, formally
opened its textile school in Fall River. MASSACHUSETTS BUREAU OF LABOR,
TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF LABOR (1899) at
604 [hereinafter TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT]. It expressed gratitude to
Crompton & Knowles Loom Company for giving a Stafford dobby head for use in
the union’s textile school, to the Draper Company for two Northrop looms given to
the school, and to the Mason Machine Works for a loom sent to the textile school.
Id. at 602–03. The same report noted that two applications for “permission to
learn the trade” were received and approved. Id. at 602. The Lawrence local
asked the Fall River local for information on how to establish a school. Id. at 603.
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Textile trade unionism was badly fragmented until well into the
twentieth century.176 It was easier to organize skilled workers, who
shared pride in their craft, on a purely local basis. Some of them were
considering affiliation with national or regional organizations in their
craft, however, to gain access to greater pools of striker benefits.177
The craft unions could retrain people already in the industry for a
new technology, but they were poorly positioned and hesitated to train
people to move out of their industry into another. The weavers’ union
Textile School in Lawrence,178 for example, trained its members on
new types of looms such as the Draper loom but did not re-train them
to operate spinning machines unless the union intended to claim spin-
ning as its own work.
The shift from craft to industrial unionism had implications for ad-
justment to technology’s shocks. Industrial unionism arose and be-
came dominant in basic industries without any particular focus on
apprenticeship programs or hiring halls.179 The move away from craft
unionism and the focus on the working conditions of the workforce al-
ready employed weakened union concern with job training. Though
skills acquisition might require a period of OJT, the period did not
have to be very long, and the factory owners controlled the machines
on which such training necessarily would occur.
176. See id. at 604. The report mentioned activities by the Weavers Union, the Web-
Drawers, Warpers & Spoolers Unions, the Woollen Spinners Unions, the Slasher
Tenders and Drawing-in-Girls Unions, the Loom Fixers Unions, the Cotton Mill
Operatives, Cotton Spinners Union, and the Carders Union. Id. at 591, 601, 615,
620–24. The minutes of Cotton Spinners Unions reports on some locals desig-
nated “Ring Spinners Union” and some designated “Mule Spinners Union,” and
the Carders Union. Id. at 594. The minutes of Cotton Spinners Unions reports on
some locals designated “Ring Spinners Union” and some designated “Mule Spin-
ners Union.” Id. The Carders Unions and the Spinners Unions were in federation.
Id. A 1911 Massachusetts state labor report showed the following national unions
in the textile industry. The number of accredited locals nationally is shown in
parentheses: Card Machine Operators Union of America (2), Card Room Opera-
tives of America, Amalgamated (2), Loomfixers International Union (16), Inter-
national Spinners Union (22), Textile Workers, National Industrial Union of (13),
and Textile Workers of America, United (133), Weavers, National Federation of
(7), Weavers, Amalgamated Association of the United States of America, Elastic
Goring (2). By comparison, the Order of Railway Conductors had 593 locals. MAS-
SACHUSETTS BUREAU OF LABOR, FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATIS-
TICS OF LABOR FOR THE YEAR 1911, 101–03 tbl.I (1913).
177. TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 175, at 620 (mentioning the Weavers
Union’s request to the Federation of Textile Operatives for striker benefits and a
discussion of possible affiliation with the New England Federation of Weavers).
178. See supra note 175 (describing Lawrence school).
179. Then the backlash against trade unionism in the Taft Hartley Act prohibited
closed shops. Taft Hartley Act, Pub. L. 80–101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012)). Now-illegal closed-shop agreements required one to be
a member of the union to be hired in the first place. That was how hiring halls
worked in their heyday.
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C. The South Rises: Meeting the Need for Institutionalized
Education (1880–1930)
The defining characteristic of the third era was the dramatic move-
ment of textile production from New England to the American South.
This movement was fueled not so much by new textile technology as it
was by workforce difficulties in the North and the availability of a
fresh, cheap, and docile workforce in the South. The movement was
also spurred on by the spread of railroad technologies in that region.
The most significant limitation on labor force adjustment was the un-
willingness of skilled Northern workers who had lost their jobs to
move south. In the third period, employers and unions alike began to
encourage governments to provide basic education, especially in the
South, where the hill country whites being recruited for the textile
mills lacked basic literacy.180
The creative technological changes that defined the era mainly oc-
curred in areas other than textile machinery. The building of rail-
roads, which had begun in earnest before the Civil War, resulted in
fragments of mostly disconnected rail enterprises during the War. Af-
ter the War, English capital poured into a frenzy of railroad building
and integration, which connected existing and potential production
centers with markets and suppliers in a way that had never been seen
before.181 The timing was perfect for a South trying to find its way
after Reconstruction. Calls for a “New South” by Atlanta Constitution
publisher Henry Grady and others singled out railroads and textile
manufacturing as the engines of the future for this new South.182 Fur-
thermore, improvements in stationary steam engine technology meant
that Southern mills could be located anywhere and were no longer tied
to the fall lines on Southern rivers, which tended to be much further
from coastal shipping transportation than the fall lines in New
England.
180. See generally Jacquelyn Down Hall, et al., Cotton Mill People: Work, Communica-
tion, and Protest in the Textile South, 1880–1940, 91 AM. HIST. REV. 245, 247–61
(1986) (analyzing the sociology of hill-country whites recruited to the mills).
181. MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA: FROM CIVIL WAR TO RE-
DEMPTION IN THE COTTON SOUTH 205–28 (2017) (describing state subsidy of rail-
roads); id. at 254–56 (describing post-default conflict with bondholders over
Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad); MARK W. SUMMERS, RAILROADS, RECON-
STRUCTION, AND THE GOSPEL OF PROSPERITY 213–36 (1984) (discussing the “Ala-
bama and Chattanooga Catastrophe”); see also State v. Cobb, 64 Ala. 127, 140
(1879) (referring to English bondholders in a suit for writ of mandamus to gover-
nor to endorse bonds); Stanton v. Alabama & C.R. Co., 22 F. Cas. 1070 (Cir. Ct.,
S.D. Ala. 1875) (describing claims by railroad bondholders).
182. RAYMOND B. NIXON, HENRY W. GRADY: SPOKESMAN OF THE NEW SOUTH (1943)
(describing calls for cotton manufacturing in the South); id. at 241–50 (reporting
Grady’s speech to New England Society in New York urging Northern capitalists,
predominantly from the textile industry, to invest in the South).
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Technology’s destructive impact on labor markets and workers
harmed New England and benefitted the South. As the era
progressed, labor markets grew slack in New England and were tight
in the South, until the third decade of the twentieth century. The
move from the farm to textile mill occurred in the South fifty years
later than the similar migration in New England.183 High cotton
prices after the Civil War—the result of pent-up demand after war-
time interruptions to cotton commerce were lifted—and the growing
demand as ever-more productive textile machinery was installed in
mills caused a scramble to bring plantation land back into produc-
tion.184 The planters, meanwhile, whose larger plots of land offered
more efficient production, did everything they could think of to attract
a labor force. However, they lacked capital to pay cash wages. The end
result was sharecropping, with most croppers being white.185
Poor whites, on the other hand, were returning in the thousands
from service in the Confederate Army. They found their society de-
stroyed; whatever places they had occupied as overseers and
craftsmen on the plantations had disappeared.186 They wanted to
take up farming because that’s what most people did, and that is what
183. Compare section IV.A with this subsection (revealing dates of migration).
184. See generally Joseph D. Reid, Jr., Sharecropping in History and Theory, 49 AGRIC.
HIST. 426, 426–27 (1975) (analyzing origins and organization of sharecropping).
185. Blacks participated in the new wage economy but were suspicious of the terms of
work with their old masters, and they thought they had more attractive alterna-
tives. The Freedmen’s Bureau encouraged them to believe that they should wait
out wage work because the government would give them forty acres and a mule.
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Truth Behind ‘40 Acres and a Mule,’ http://
www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history/the-truth-be
hind-40-acres-and-a-mule/ [https://perma.unl.edu/4XPE-XRYE] (tracing slogan to
General William T. Sherman’s Soeciuak Field Order No. 15, Jan 16, 1865 as a
model for post-war land redistribution). Section 4 of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act
authorized a three-year grant of land not to exceed 40 acres to “refugees” and
“freedmen”). See generally CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP 31 (1978); Walter L. Fleming,
“Forty Acres and a Mule,” 182 N. AM. REV. 721 (May 1906). Blacks were in no
hurry voluntarily to restrict their newfound freedom and were, for about a decade
after the Civil War, not a significant workforce for cotton production.
186. Some 76% of the white population before the Civil War did not own slaves.
Wealth Culture in the South, LUMENLEARNING.COM, https://courses.lumenlearn
ing.com/ushistory1os2xmaster/chapter/wealth-and-culture-in-the-south/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/2JUK-9BA3] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
Below the wealthy planters were the yeoman farmers, or small landown-
ers. Below yeomen were poor, landless whites, who made up the majority
of whites in the South. These landless white men dreamed of owning
land and slaves and served as slave overseers, drivers, and traders in the
southern economy. In fact, owning land and slaves provided one of the
only opportunities for upward social and economic mobility. In the
South, living the American dream meant possessing slaves, producing
cotton, and owning land.
Id.
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they had done before.187 Hill country farmers, mostly white, who had
historically engaged in subsistence farming of a variety of crops,
shifted into cotton to help satisfy the demand. Lenders were more will-
ing to lend money on a cash crops like cotton than to lend against
other crops intended mainly for home consumption. The high cotton
prices induced many poor whites to buy plots so small they were sus-
tainable only with supra-normal cotton prices. Those who could not
afford their own land right away became sharecroppers, motivated by
the dream of someday owning their own land.188
The unsettled labor market conditions, especially for the whites,
induced another phenomenon: the realization that the South never
could be economically successful unless it reduced its dependence on
agriculture and a single crop. As Reconstruction ended, and as rail-
road building in the South boomed, more voices were calling on the
leadership in the deep South to embrace manufacturing.189 Cotton
textile manufacturing was a logical initiative: process the cotton near
where it grows. To do so, however, the South had to attract capital.
Appeals for investors in the North and abroad to invest in Southern
mills emphasized the proximity of the raw material,190 the availabil-
ity of convenient water power,191 and—most of all—the availability of
187. Lee J. Alston & Robert Higgs, Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture Since the
Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests, 42 J. ECON. HIST. 327, 337 (describing
market conditions immediately after war).
188. By 1909, more than 70% of the land was worked by croppers and tenants. Id.
(describing market conditions immediately after war). A well-defined status hier-
archy existed, in which laborers aspired to rise from wage hand, to cropper on
shares, to share tenant, to fixed payment renter, to owner-operator. Id. at 334
(describing the “ladder” of progression). But dreams were hard to realize. More
and more, white sharecroppers sought refuge from a marginal and worsening ex-
istence on the hill-country farms. The incentive was greater autonomy. The pos-
sibilities depended on amassing greater capital and expertise. The text’s
discussion of Southern industrialization uses the term “sharecropper” as a short-
hand, not only for actual sharecroppers, but also for subsistence farmers who
may have owned their land or farmed under other economic arrangements. See
Stephen V. Ash, Poor Whites in the Occupied South, 1861–1865, 57 J. S. HIST. 39,
41–44 (1991) (describing poor whites and their economic conditions).
189. The best known of these was Henry Grady, editor and part owner of the Atlanta
Constitution. He regularly preached his New South vision to northern as well as
southern audiences, one including financier J.P. Morgan, between 1880 and
1889. See NIXON, supra note 182, at 181–82, 242.
190. Objectively, savings in freight costs for raw materials were less than they might
have seemed, because long-staple cotton had to be shipped from Mississippi. Sav-
ings did result, however, from being able to deliver local cotton to the mills in
loosely packed ginnery bales rather than in compressed form. Sometimes the gin
was integrated with other stages of manufacturing. Most important, however,
was that the output of Southern mills still was shipped north for finishing, so
that the fiber had to make a trip north anyway—just at a later stage of produc-
tion. MELVIN THOMAS COPELAND, THE COTTON MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY OF THE
UNITED STATES 36–38 (1912) (evaluating the claim of lower freight charges).
191. A dubious claim. 67% of the Southern mills were powered by steam. Id. at 38 n.1.
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surplus labor in the form of underemployed hill country farmers.192
Investors from outside the region heeded the call, including many
New England mill owners.193 Local merchants and bankers invested
as well. Poor white farm families were eager to go to work in the new
mills and earn cash wages. By 1890, the level of cotton manufacturing
in the South was such that Southern boosters talked about their cot-
ton mills putting a nail in the coffin of Northern mills, turning the
tables on Samuel Webster who had remarked before the Civil War
that Northern manufacturing would be the nail in the coffin of the
South.
By 1910, Southern mills had 11.2 million spindles and 2,942 looms,
90% of them in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Alabama.194 Northern
mill owners could not ignore the accelerating loss of market share to
Southern mills. They jumped at the chance to blame it on their higher
cost structure, resulting in large part, they concluded, from labor law
reform in the North. They perceived legislators in Massachusetts, and
elsewhere in New England, as antagonistic to manufacturers. South-
ern promoters were eager to re-enforce this idea and explicitly com-
pared their business-friendly politics with political hostility in the
North. Southern promoters also made effective use of racist and nati-
vist concerns, emphasizing that the workforce of the South was not
only placid and willing to work for low wages; it also was white, En-
glish speaking, and native born.195
Dwight Manufacturing, one of the leading New England manufac-
turers, responded favorably to the invitations from the governor of Al-
abama and the mayor of Guntersville to set up a mill in northern
Alabama. Dwight subsequently shut down its New England facilities
and moved all production to the South.196
192. Id. at 39 (“[T]he corner-stone of the structure has been the supply of cheap and
tractable labor.”).
193. J.P. Stevens, for example, began in Andover, Massachusetts, expanded to Haver-
hill in 1854 on the Merrimack Rivers, and then moved south. The Stephens fam-
ily had been in banking from its earliest days in textile manufacturing. AMERICAN
WOOD AND COTTON REPORTER, HISTORY OF AMERICAN TEXTILES: WITH KINDRED
AND AUXILIARY INDUSTRIES 300 (1922).
194. COPELAND, supra note 190, at 35.
195. See BROADUS MITCHELL, THE RISE OF COTTON MILLS IN THE SOUTH 169–73, 171
n.20 (2001) (extolling virtues of poor white Southern labor, compared with North-
ern labor); David Brian Robertson, CAPITAL, LABOR & STATE: THE BATTLE FOR
AMERICAN LABOR MARKETS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE NEW DEAL 18 (2000)
(summarizing labor-force arguments to pull Northern textile industry to the
South); BETH ENGLISH, A COMMON THREAD: LABOR, POLITICS, AND CAPITAL MOBIL-
ITY IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY 14–17 (2006) (reporting on efforts to use characteris-
tics of poor-white Southerners as textile mill workers to attract capital to the
South).
196. ENGLISH, supra note 195, at 46 (reporting on successful efforts by Alabama offi-
cials to lure Dwight to Alabama).
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An obvious mechanism for adjusting to the labor market displace-
ment caused by textile production moving out of New England into the
South was for the New England workforce to follow and migrate to the
South.197 This did not occur to any significant degree. Northerners
migrated west in significant numbers after the Civil War, and black
and white Southerners migrated north, but few Northerners in the
laboring classes went South.198 Migration into the South from the
North was limited to entrepreneurs and speculators who made up the
“carpetbagger” population.199 The South experienced a considerable
outflow of population to the North and West, accelerating in the twen-
tieth century.200
Several factors explain the lack of labor mobility in response to the
interregional capital mobility. First, the New England textile industri-
alists were trying to escape their workforces as much as their state
legislatures. Unionization was growing, protests of compensation
practices and working conditions were militant, and the state legisla-
tures were merely responding. Capitalists perceived that much of the
unrest was due to foreign ideologies infecting their workforce. The last
thing they wanted was for their, by now, largely immigrant workforce
to follow them south. Only a handful of supervisors were needed to
teach the necessary skills to the hill country whites in the South.
Second, political and business leadership in the South did not want
them. The central theme of the promoters of the New South was that
Northern industrialists, if they built plants in the South, could find a
hard-working, English-speaking, native-born, and pliable workforce
who would be delighted with the jobs regardless of the terms of-
197. See George Winston Smith, Some Northern Wartime Attitudes Toward the Post-
Civil War South, 10 J.S. HIST. 253, 255 (1944) (describing unsuccessful pre-War
plans to colonize the south with Northern migrants). The fantasies continued
during the War. “Oh, for a thousand yankees to enter and make a paradise of this
magnificent region!” Id. at 256–57; id. at 259–61 (describing a boom in Southern
real estate sales to Northern buyers); id. at 261 (describing the belief that an
influx of free labor from the north would solve the post-war labor shortage); id. at
263 (describing calls for European immigration to the South).
198. A chart of migration patterns in the United States shows that in 1900, almost no
one in the South was born in New England, while substantial numbers of re-
sidents of western states were. Mapping Migration in the United States, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/upshot/mapping-mi-
gration-in-the-united-states-since-1900.html [https://perma.unl.edu/K9DK-
ZB7Y].
199. Smith, supra note 197, at 257 (referring to border states during the war as “mag-
nets” of interest for the more adventurous Northern investors).
200. America’s Great Migrations, UNIV. OF WASH., http://depts.washington.edu/mov-
ing1/ [https://perma.unl.edu/BTQ7-BQ4C] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (“More than
20 million whites left the South during the 20th century, vastly outnumbering
the 7-8 African Americans who left.”).
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fered.201 The Southern population generally resented what they per-
ceived as exploitation by the carpetbaggers, and they were no
friendlier to laborers and speculators from New England, New York,
or Pennsylvania.
Third, the New England textile workers did not want to go south.
After the war, the Northern press played up the savagery of the Ku
Klux Klan, the struggles of reconstruction governments to suppress
the Klan and other examples of racial and sectional hatred, and the
eventual abandonment of the effort to contain this hatred after the
election of 1876. A New Englander was not likely to want to take him-
self or his family into such a dangerous place where he likely would
become a target. Why go south and get murdered if you could take
your family and start a farm with government support in Kansas?
No retraining of a migrating Northern workforce would have been
necessary because the Southern mills, for the first couple of decades,
were equipped with machinery already installed in the Northern
mills. In the absence of migration, however, training of an entirely
new workforce drawn from the poor hill country whites was necessary.
While Southern political and business leaders were eager to wel-
come New England textile capitalists, Southern hill-country share-
croppers were not well prepared to work productively. Illiteracy was
high. Even if they knew how to farm effectively, they had no experi-
ence with machinery. Thus, the Southern textile factory owners faced
a training challenge for their new workforce. In the hill country
whites, they had the potential labor force who would work cheaply.
But no one in the labor force knew anything about spinning or weav-
ing; neither did the industrialists themselves. They had to meet their
workforce training needs by importing a critical mass of experienced
personnel from New England or Britain, who already had established
textile industries. An explicit part of the assignment of such recruits
was to provide training. Once the first round of training was complete,
the system relied on family units in the mills to transfer the skills
intergenerationally. “Another mill employee began work at the age of
fourteen. Her mother trained her on the job, and together they put in
a very long day. I went to the mill when I was fourteen years old, and
my mother learnt me to reel.”202 By hiring entire families, mill owners
201. Grady, “New South” Speech (Dec. 22, 1886), https://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/
topics/history/article/late-nineteenth-century-1878-1900/henry-gradys-new-
south-speech-dec.-22-1886 [https://perma.unl.edu/MB8J-TV9J] (“We have fallen
in love with work.”).
202. Bennett M. Judkins & Dorothy Lodge, The Evolution of Textile Mill Villages, TAR
HEEL JUNIOR HISTORIAN (Fall 1986), reprinted in Bennett M. Judkins & Dorothy
Lodge, The Evolution of Textile Mill Villages, NCPEDIA, https://www.ncpedia.org/
textiles/mill-villages [https://perma.unl.edu/RU2K-F4HD] (last visited Oct. 23,
2019).
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could shift some of the training responsibility to parents and older
siblings.203
The mill families initially worked under a set of informal arrange-
ments that came to be known as the “customary rules.”204 These rules
allowed workers considerable flexibility to take care of non-mill-re-
lated activities even during their shifts. Females frequently went
home to fix a meal, check on their youngest children, or rest. Male
workers took off to take care of farm tasks and sometimes hunt and
fish. Children drifted in and out of the unfenced mills to play with
each other or take meals at home.205 In some cases, mill managers
hired an extra 25% of the workforce just to fill in for the absentees.206
It was common for workers to cover for each other and later make up
for production lost when they were absent.207 One worker was quoted
as saying that he was pretty regular in attendance, taking only one
day a week off.208 All of this was acceptable to the mill owners because
the labor rates were so much lower in the South than in the Northern
mills that they were able to earn a handsome return on investment.209
Southern mill owners emphasized their “social consciousness,”
which began as an inducement for families to leave their farms and
work in the mills and continued to attract workers in times of labor
shortages after the basic workforce was in place. Increasing output as
more and more production moved south out of New England created
an intense labor shortage. More successful mill owners intensified
their efforts to build a sense of community with their workforces, pro-
moting fathers to overseer positions and advertising improvements in
millworker housing, schools, and churches.210
Southern textile mill owners were even more involved than their
New England counterparts in establishing, operating, and financing
schools because the public education system was so weak.211 Govern-
ment per pupil expenditures in Massachusetts in 1907 were $43.12.
During the same time period, per pupil expenditures were $9.06 in
North Carolina and $6.90 in South Carolina.212 The mill owners es-
tablished schools to attract the best workers,213 to impart literacy and
203. See generally CATHY L. MCHUGH, MILL FAMILY: THE LABOR SYSTEM IN THE SOUTH-
ERN COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY 1880–1915 (1988).
204. JANET IRONS, TESTING THE NEW DEAL: THE GENERAL TEXTILE STRIKE OF 1934 IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH 15 (2000) (explaining the “customary rules”).
205. Id. at 15 (giving examples).
206. Id. at 16.
207. Id. at 19 (summarizing practices).
208. Id. at 16 (quoting the worker).
209. Id. at 24 (reporting that wages in the south were 40% lower).
210. Id. at 18 (describing efforts to deal with labor shortage).
211. Cathy L. McHugh, Schooling in the Post-Bellum Southern Cotton Mill Villages,
20 J. SOC. HIST. 149 (1986).
212. Id. at 150.
213. Id. at 151.
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basic arithmetic skills to an ignorant population,214 to socialize chil-
dren to a good work ethic,215 and to provide a kind of buffer—a sur-
plus labor force that could be called upon in times of high demand.216
The mill owners avoided the problems of premature exit that un-
dermined the economic incentives for masters to take in appren-
tices.217 The owners embedded school attendees in a family-oriented
work system in which the parents of children who did not come to
work in the mills that schooled them might lose their jobs and their
housing.218 The schools usually limited their instruction to the basic
“Three R’s” out of a concern that children afforded a secondary educa-
tion would be more likely to leave.219
Despite the availability of this training, many parents were
unenthusiastic because they needed their children’s income and be-
cause they thought the training was too academic, as opposed to voca-
tional, to benefit the children.220 Although 92% of elementary school
graduates at the turn of the twentieth century earned a living with
manual labor, only 5% received any direct preparation in the public
schools.221 Employers favored industrial schools and night programs
to train potential workers.222 The National Association of Manufac-
turers established a committee in 1904 that recommended evening
trade schools at the high school level as a better alternative to em-
ployer OJT programs in the form of apprenticeships or otherwise.223
Unions opposed the schools, though their opposition moderated some-
what by 1910.224
Trade schools—mostly private and mostly separate from the public
school system—had begun to spring up in a few places in the United
States just before the Civil War, and the pace accelerated after the
war.225
At the turn of the twentieth century, formal textile education pro-
grams were limited.226 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s
214. Id. at 154.
215. Id. at 153.
216. Id. at 154.
217. See supra section IV.A.
218. McHugh, supra note 211, at 152.
219. Id. at 152.
220. Id. at 155–57.
221. BECKWITH, supra note 55, at 29 (reporting on a YMCA survey).
222. Id. at 22.
223. Id. at 22–23 (characterizing NAM efforts and summarizing arguments in favor of
trade schools).
224. Id. at 24–26 (reporting union opposition).
225. Id. at 27–28 (describing the history of trade schools).
226. See Christopher P. Brooks, A Review of Recent Progress in Textile Education in
the United States, TEXTILE WORLD REC. (1906), at 76, 77 [hereinafter Textile Edu-
cation] (reporting only two textile schools, the Philadelphia Textile School and
the Lowell Textile School, and one correspondence school, the Correspondence
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original mechanical engineering department had a branch in 1883
known as “mill engineering,” subsequently renamed “textile engineer-
ing.”227 The Lowell Technical School was established in 1897.228 The
Georgia School of Technology (Georgia Tech) established a textile en-
gineering program in 1897, modelled on the Lowell Technical School.
The Georgia Tech program had financial and in-kind support from
Fulton Bag & Cotton Company, as well as a number of New England
manufacturers.229 North Carolina established a textile school in 1899
as part of the newly formed North Carolina Agricultural and Mechani-
cal College (now North Carolina State University) in Raleigh.230 The
program offered courses in cotton manufacturing, carding and spin-
ning, weaving, textile design, and textile chemistry and dyeing. An
early instructor was Thomas Nelson, a graduate of Preston Technical
School in England and formerly an instructor at the Lowell Textile
School.231
Within ten years, however, the number of regular programs in-
creased, including college level programs, and correspondence schools
proliferated.232
School of Textiles (later the Textile Department of the International Correspon-
dence Schools) in 1899).
227. History of the Department of Mechanical Engineering, MASS. INST. TECH. DEP’T
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, http://meche.mit.edu/meche-history-and-timeline
[https://perma.unl.edu/ASG3-GUGW] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (noting that the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Mechanical Engineering
became a formal department in 1883, offering a specialization in mill
engineering).
228. Christopher P. Brooks, TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COTTON
MANUFACTURERS 170, 174 (1897) (“The object of the school is to give instruction in
the practical knowledge necessary in the cotton, woolen, worsted and other tex-
tile industries, in science and art, as applied to these industries, and in the
processes and methods for the purpose of improving any special trade, or of intro-
ducing new branches of industry. It is essentially a trade school, and the whole
plan provides for such instruction only as will be found useful in textile trades.”).
229. School of Textile Engineering Notebook: Overview, GEORGIA TECH LIBRARY, https:/
/finding-aids.library.gatech.edu/repositories/2/resources/52 [https://perma.unl.
edu/RWW6-CSCC] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019); Splendid Growth: The Textile Ed-
ucation Enterprise at Georgia Tech, GA. TECH LIBR., https://exhibit-
archive.library.gatech.edu/gtbuildings/french/growth.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/
QPM7-JG8T] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
230. Historical State Timelines: College of Textiles, N.C. ST. U. LIBR., https://historical-
state.lib.ncsu.edu/timelines/college-of-textiles [https://perma.unl.edu/3CR4-
PJ4X] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
231. Id.; Textile Prize Essays, 26 AM. WOOL & COTTON REP. 843 (1912) (providing a
biographic summary for Thomas Nelson).
232. Textile Education, supra note 226, at 77 (reporting thousands of enrollees at tex-
tile correspondence schools; the author was a proprietor of a correspondence
school).
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D. Global markets: Trying to Shift the Responsibility to the
Government (1930–2000)
The fourth era was one in which foreign competition blindsided
American industry, which responded by hiding behind trade barriers
and ceding innovation to foreign engineers and equipment manufac-
turers. The fourth era was the first in which groups interested in the
textile industry began to call for overt federal government action to
train and retrain workers to facilitate adjustment to creative
destruction.
The center of gravity of creative technological change passed from
the United States to other countries during this period.233 Without
intending to marginalize the effect of political revolutions, wars, post-
war reconstruction, and economic development theory, the rise of Asia
as the center of textile production was facilitated by two technological
revolutions. As significant as the power loom, the water frame, the
ring spinner, and the Draper loom were in the first two eras, global
trade in textiles and apparel would not be what it is without revolu-
tions in ocean shipping, airfreight, and telecommunications.
The containership revolution in the last quarter of the twentieth
century dramatically lowered shipping costs and reduced delays for
both shipping raw materials to Asian centers of production and ship-
ping their product back to markets in the developed economies of
North America and Europe.234 Containerization also sharply reduced
loading and unloading times. This significantly increased the competi-
tiveness of the global textile industry.
The Lockheed C-5 and Boeing 747 wide-bodied aircraft, and their
successors, put the cost of airfreight within the reach of the shippers
and consignees of any good that required urgent handling.235
Earlier revolutions in transoceanic communications made it feasi-
ble for the first time to coordinate closely linked steps in the produc-
233. See JOHN SINGLETON, THE WORLD TEXTILE INDUSTRY 45–47 (1997) (reporting ex-
tremely low levels of research and development investment by the U.S. textile
industry compared with other U.S. industries and with the textile industry in
other countries).
234. See MARC LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 218 (2006) (noting how reductions in
ocean shipping costs revitalized the Japanese apparel industry in 1967); id. at
272–73 (noting establishment of major container ports in countries of large tex-
tile and apparel exports).
235. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 97TH CONG., REP. ON IMPACT OF ADVANCED AIR
TRANSPORT TECHNOLOGY: PART 2—THE AIR CARGO SYSTEM 21 (1982) (discussing
the impact of the B-747 on the average cost of air freight); Stephen Dowling, The
Boeing 747: The Plane that Shrank the World, BBC (Sept. 28, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/future/article/20180927-the-boeing-747-the-plane-that-shrank-the-
world [https://perma.unl.edu/CG5P-9DKJ] (describing the history of the 747 and
its relationship to the C-5).
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tion and marketing processes. The diffusion of wireless
communication technology and the laying of the transpacific telegraph
cable in the first part of the century236 put Asia, Europe, and America
in real-time communication.
Textile-driven Southern prosperity was not to last. Japan was
ramping up its textile technologies and opening its borders to foreign
trade, even as fragmentation of industry structure in the South made
periodic overproduction and collapse of prices inevitable. Virtually all
the mills in the South were small, relatively isolated rural enterprises.
No single mill had the capacity to monitor the overall levels of indus-
try production of thread or cloth. When overproduction occurred and
prices began to fall as a result, the only responsive strategy was to
produce even more and to cut costs so that increased volumes would
make the lower price sustainable.237
In the 1920s, “Taylorism”238 took hold. Efficiency experts were eve-
rywhere. Now managers responded to their recommendations and
subdivided jobs to create more narrowly specialized jobs that were
more efficient. They sought new productivity enhancing machinery
and did “speedups” and “stretch-outs” to get more out of their existing
workforce, thereby reducing per-unit labor costs further. Maintaining
the customary rules was entirely inconsistent with these new
practices.239
Part of the productivity improvement campaign was a loss of inter-
est in the family system. Children were increasingly replaced by adult
men who had greater skills and could work faster, although they com-
manded higher wage rates.240 The children left the mills and went
back home. The women either had to stay home to care for them or
hire childcare workers, which reduced the economic benefit of working
in the mills.241
The interest in scientific management coincided with a growing la-
bor surplus. The labor surplus was fueled by increasing farm produc-
236. See Marcel Brown, The First Transpacific Telegraph Cable, THIS DAY IN TECH
HIST., http://thisdayintechhistory.com/12/14/the-first-transpacific-telegraph-
cable/ [https://perma.unl.edu/LL23-5K7A] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
237. IRONS, supra note 204, at 24–25 (noting industry structure and effect on
microeconomics of industry).
238. See Jill Lepore, Not So Fast, NEW YORKER (Oct. 5, 2009), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/12/not-so-fast [https://perma.unl.edu/
2YYT-F7U6] (describing Frederick Winslow Taylor’s industrial engineering doc-
trines, which came to be known as “Taylorism”); Idea: Scientific Management,
ECONOMIST (Feb. 9, 2009), https://www.economist.com/news/2009/02/09/scientific-
management [https://perma.unl.edu/W4S4-Z7CZ] (reporting on Frederick Wins-
low Taylor’s “scientific management”).
239. Id. at 22–23 (describing efficiency experts and the resulting disruption of worker
culture).
240. Id. at 23–24.
241. Id.
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tivity mixed with crop failures, significantly crop failures caused by
the boll weevil.242 Now bargaining power shifted toward the employ-
ers and, although the workers were unhappy with the demise of the
customary rules and with the speedups and stretch-outs, there was a
little they could do about it. The power of the wildcat strike, so great
only a decade before, now was minimized because there was always a
“barefoot boy” at the door, ready to take a striker’s job.243 Tensions
built towards the 1934 Southern textile workers strike.
As foreign competition increased through the balance of the twenti-
eth century, innovative energy passed from the United States to over-
seas. The basic functions of spinning and weaving have not changed
since before the Industrial Revolution. Fiber are still separated from
foreign matter, combed, drafted, and twisted into thread of the desired
diameter and tensile strength. Then, the threads are turned into cloth
by interleaving threads running in one direction with threads running
in another direction. For weaving, heddles still raise or lower warp
threads, and a device passes the weft reed through the shed created by
the heddles. Then each of these new “picks” are beaten. The changes
in mechanization and automation in the last 200 years have involved
speeding things up, controlling individual heddles with computer-con-
trolled servomechanisms attached to each, and replacing shuttles and
bobbins with rapiers and air jets.
Spinning technologies at the end of the twentieth and beginning of
the twenty-first centuries are migrating from hundred-year-old ring
spinning to rotary, vortex, open-end, or air-jet spinning.244 The em-
phasis on loom innovation in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries relate to the elimination of the shuttle passing the weft
thread back and forth through the warp.245
242. Id. at 25 (describing the labor surplus that developed in the mid-1920s).
243. Id. (quoting an older worker).
244. In the new technologies, a mechanical wheel resembling a small card separates a
small number of fibers from the sliver. Suction pulls the fibers into a spinning
cone, where centrifugal force causes them to aggregate in a groove. More intense
suction pulls the collected fibers out through an orifice, which imparts a twist as
they are pulled out. See Vortex Spinning Process: Principle of Vortex Spinning
System, TEXTILE LEARNER, http://textilelearner.blogspot.com/2013/01/vortex-spin-
ning-process-principle-of.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6WG5-PVEE] (last visited
Oct. 24, 2019).
245. Their characteristics, combined with the laws of Newtonian physics, limit the
potential for further speed improvement. The mass of the empty shuttle, com-
bined with the mass of an empty bobbin, and with the mass of the weft thread
wound around it are substantial. The speed of a pick is directly proportional to
the velocity of the shuttle as it traverses the warp. The amount of force needed on
each side to stop the shuttle and send it on its way in the other direction was
proportional to its total mass and to the square of its velocity and inversely pro-
portional to the amount of space used to stop it and reverse its direction of
motion.
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A certain amount of human involvement is still required to doff
bobbins, to detect and mend broken warp threads, to operate cranes
and forklifts to move rolls of warp and cloth around, and to prepare
new warps for installation on the looms. The frontier of automation is
to extend computerized control of the whole process and to replace the
remaining human attendants with robots.
Twenty-first century looms and preparation machines need no at-
tendants. They detect faults such as broken threads, often repair them
automatically, and sound alarms if they need human assistance. A
single attendant can effectively monitor dozens of machines. Similar
advances were occurring in the apparel industry at the turn of the
twenty-first century.246
Sakachi Toyda, the founder of Toyota, is credited with inventing
advanced stop mechanisms in 1896.247 This technology is an example
of innovations that significantly improved the productivity of labor248
and symbolized the Japanese inventiveness that would overtake New
England’s.
The market share of knits increased in the twentieth century as
the popularity of less formal clothing grew, and everyone wanted T-
shirts after the Second World War, not only as underwear, but also as
sportswear. In 2019, roughly 50% of clothing was knitwear and
roughly 50% weaves.
As weaving speeds increase, so do the forces, and their reciprocating nature
puts stress on the overall frame of the loom. This stress creates hazards when a
shuttle occasionally breaks through the arresting apparatus at the sides of the
loom, escapes into free flight, and becomes a missile. The problems could be miti-
gated somewhat by decreasing the size of the shuttle and the bobbin, but then the
bobbin would have to be changed more often, eliminating any benefit from faster
shuttle speed.
The basic solution is to redesign the loom so that a bobbin need not carry the
spool of weft thread through the shed. Instead, the spool of thread, now generally
known as the pirn, would remain stationary just outside the edges of the warp
and only a new piece of weft thread would be inserted in the shed. Four basic
ways of doing this developed: air jets, water jets, rapiers, and projectiles. One
observer picturesquely calls these “cough” (air-jet), “spit” (water jet), “stab” (ra-
pier), and “shoot” (projectile) looms. See Royston Millmore, Yet the Shuttle Flies,
71 NEW SCIENTIST 138, 138–39 (1976). Rapiers and projectiles have much less
mass than shuttles, and thus the amount of force needed to insert and withdraw
them is far less.
246. See Meenu Srivastava, An Overview of Apparel Design and Production Technol-
ogy in Garment Sector, FIBRE2FASHION, http://images.fibre2fashion.com/ArticleR-
esources/PdfFiles/53/5205.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/K5W4-KQ99] (last visited
Oct. 24, 2019) (providing an overview of apparel technology, with pictures of in-
dustrial sewing machines). See Peters, supra note 5.
247. Toyota Production System, TOYOTA, bit.ly/2Ijyryt [https://perma.unl.edu/M3GV-
M69U] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
248. Unless a loom was stopped quickly when an end broke, many yards of cloth could
be ruined, decreasing the number of yards per worker that would be woven.
Yards per worker is a basic measure of labor productivity.
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Half a century later, textile production moved out of the American
South and predominately to Asia and the workforce felt the pain
acutely. Poisonous labor–management relations, which had marked
Southern institutions even more acutely and viciously than it had
New England industry, made it difficult for labor and management to
work together to explore solutions. For whatever reasons of failure of
entrepreneurial energy and imagination, the Southern mill owners
were slow to recognize the foreign threat, or, if they did recognize it, to
do anything about it. They invested in new technologies only slug-
gishly and generally expended their competitive energies on mills
across the street rather than those in Bangladesh or Korea. They as-
sumed that their political muscle would ensure trade barriers that
would deal with the problem.
It was not clear what U.S. mill owners could do about the threat.
Trade barriers to foreign textiles had remained high, even as barriers
fell for the output of other industries. Still, the American market
share was eroding. Part of the problem was the unenforceability of the
barriers; another was the realization that much of the capital histori-
cally facing only domestic investment opportunities now could be in-
vested overseas. The entrepreneurs who saw that possibility did not
want barriers to earning returns on such capital.
By the election of 1960, trade adjustment assistance was on the
national political agenda. Democratic presidential candidate John
Kennedy, after all, was from Massachusetts. His “Get America moving
again” slogan embraced the plight of New England textile workers.
His proposals for trade adjustment assistance mollified labor because
economists assured labor interests that trade adjustment assistance
would be effective in cushioning the adverse effect of innovation in the
industry. No contrary evidence existed, yet. The debate over interna-
tional trade distracted textile industry participants from acknowledg-
ing that, up to that point, the most ruinous competition had come, not
from abroad, but from the American South.249 Employers saw no ad-
vantage in re-training their workforces for any other trade, so they
just laid them off, even when they were seeking more workers at their
other mills.
Political efforts fell short due to divisions within the industry and
because policymakers had other things on their mind, such as the
Cold War, the Civil Rights Revolution, the Vietnam war protests, and
Nixon’s near-impeachment and subsequent resignation. Market orien-
tation gradually replaced notions of the regulated state throughout
the 1980s, and the Republican administrations of the 1990s were not
249. ENGLISH, supra note 195, at 129–52 (summarizing the competitive threat from
Southern mills).
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ones where proposals for trade barriers and protection of textile work-
ers would fall on fertile soil.
A number of American institutional and cultural features of the
era made adjustment more difficult—in particular, trade barriers and
immigration restrictions. The textile industry in the United States
evolved under constant protection from import barriers. Throughout
the succeeding 200 years, every initiative to reduce trade barriers was
met with screams of protest from the industry—and increasingly by
unions as well—and every reversal in economic fortunes was blamed
as much as possible on foreign trade. The competitive threat came, not
from abroad but from the American South from about 1880 to 1930 or
so, but the industry made every effort to keep the rhetoric focused on
foreign, rather than domestic, threats.250
The rhetoric of unfair trade was almost never expressed in the
form of, “They have superior technology.” It was always in the form of,
“They don’t pay a living wage but we do, and therefore we can’t com-
pete.” Admitting to being laggards in technology would not resonate
nearly as well with legislators and the public as a claim that fellow
citizens were being threatened by slave-like conditions abroad.
Even after trade barriers dropped for almost everything else, in the
last quarter of the twentieth century,251 they remained high for tex-
tiles and apparel under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA),252 which
lasted until 2005.253
Southern textile workers proved just as unwilling to relocate to
chase new job opportunities as had their New England brothers and
sisters a generation before. Americans are less likely to consider work-
ing abroad than other nationalities.254 As American textile mills grad-
ually closed their doors, their employees, if they wanted to continue to
work, had to look to different industries. They received little help from
250. MINCHIN, supra note 107, at 31 (noting efforts to mute talk of Southern competi-
tion, even when data showed that was what threatened New England mills).
251. See U.S. Average Tariff Rates (1821– 2016), U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/Average_Tar
iff_Rates_in_USA_%281821-2016%29.png [https://perma.unl.edu/XJR2-KVV4]
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (graphing tariff rates and dutiable imports); Peter
Walkenhorst, Quantitative Assessments of Textiles Trade Liberalization: A Sur-
vey, 20 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 139, 139–40 (2005).
252. See MINCHIN, supra note 107, at 79 (explaining that the MFA was an exception to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO Agreements).
253. Id. at 195–97 (discussing the phase-out of MFA).
254. Emmie Martin, 59% of Millennials in the US Would Move to Another Country for
a Job, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2014, 3:46 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/mil
lennials-moving-abroad-for-jobs-2014-10 [https://perma.unl.edu/VK4N-UCPD]
(reporting that Americans have historically been less likely than others to con-
sider working in foreign countries).
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their former employers and little effective help from their
governments.255
V. OTHER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS
The foregoing recapitulation of the 200-year history of the Ameri-
can textile history shows Joseph M. Schumpeter’s creative destruction
at work. It is not only the history of innovations in technology and
work organization; it also is the history of disruption of worker lives.
The early paternalism for the mill girls faded away, unraveling the
cocoons in which they enjoyed early parts of their young lives. Work-
ers perceived increased work for the same amount of pay as speedups
and stretch-outs, even when the cause was the implementation of new
technologies rather than an effort to make them work harder. Tech-
nology that permitted employees with lower levels of narrower skills
to operate the machines threatened the status of more experienced
craftsmen. Then, the move south in search of a more hospitable busi-
ness climate devastated entire communities in New England as the
mills there closed. Fifty years later the process of creative destruction
continued, but the stimulus had shifted from Southern efficiencies to
Asian ones.
Efforts to mitigate the pain of worker adjustment were uneven in
their effect. That the result was not a political upheaval is due to sev-
eral escape valves: opportunity in the American West, willingness of
workers to move geographically, and UI.
A. Go West, Young Man!
Westward expansion throughout the nineteenth century and into
the twentieth century mitigated labor surpluses that were likely re-
sults of major technological innovations. The relief valve—the default
choice for those who could not find work in industry, transportation, or
merchandising—was to go west and farm. Small plots of land were
available until the latter part of the twentieth century under the
Homestead Acts.256 The existence of the frontier meant that male
workers, in whatever trade, always experienced the lure of going west,
setting up their own farm, and maybe striking it rich.
255. See supra Part III (marshaling evidence of failure of government “adjustment”
and training programs).
256. The “Homestead Acts” were a series of federal laws, beginning with the Home-
stead Act of 1862, ch.75, 12 Stat. 392, that gave away federal land to those who
wished to settle on it. Homesteading did not end until 1976, with enactment of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. Even before the 1862 Act, people
could acquire ownership of land by settling on it. See Roger D. Billings, The
Homestead Act, Pacific Railroad Act and Morrill Act, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 699,
711–12, 736 (2012) (describing the history of Homesteading Acts, including the
practice of homesteading before enactment of the 1862 Act).
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Successful farming requires skills—and lots of luck—but the skills
are not hard to learn, and character traits, such as resilience and
stamina, matter as much as technical knowledge. Most farmers led a
marginal existence, and some starved, but the perceived causes of fail-
ure were the weather or crop or animal disease. Most everyone ac-
cepted that the government cannot control those sources of
disappointment.
B. Markets and Mobility
For the most part, adjustment to creative destruction occurs as
millions of individual workers and their potential employers make de-
cisions in response to the incentives, monetary and otherwise, that op-
erate on them. Most adjustment through these pathways is largely
invisible to policymakers and analysts. A worker gets laid off. He looks
around, using his own resources, to find out what else is available,
decides for himself whether he is likely to be an attractive applicant,
and uses his personal network of friends, family members, and former
coworkers to attract a new employer’s favorable attention. If he feels,
or if someone tells him, that he’s under qualified, then he seeks out his
own means for improving his qualifications.
Markets are imperfect, however; they reveal their failures. When
the labor market leaves job openings that cannot be filled or workers
who want work but cannot find it, some aspect of the market has
failed. Organizing any kind of program to cushion market adjust-
ments confronts the perils of picking winners and losers. This is a
high-risk undertaking because the loudest calls for government inter-
vention usually come from sectors of the economy where job loss has
been greatest, and those are likely to be the sectors least likely to offer
employment opportunities in the future. Any program launched in
2008 to train people for brick-and-mortar retail jobs, taxi driver jobs,
and conventional assembly-line auto-worker jobs would have trained
people for vanishing opportunities. It would have been difficult to pre-
dict with any confidence from that vantage point how completely Ama-
zon and other e-commerce vendors would weaken brick-and-mortar
stores or the robustness of the market for jobs associated with wind
turbines and industrial robots.
Moreover, even modest, common-sense governmental initiatives to
improve the functioning of markets often do not produce the intended
results. Despite their intuitive appeals, beginning before there was an
unemployment compensation system, government-run job clearing
houses are not very effective.257 In recruiting trainees, employers rely
257. See Abe Bortz, Unemployment Insurance: Early History, VA. COMMONWEALTH
UNIV., https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/unemployment-insurance-
early-history/ [https://perma.unl.edu/XP4V-ZNM7] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
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relatively infrequently on governmental “one-stop” centers and far
more on community colleges and current employees.258 Although em-
ployers gain significant benefits from the programs,259 dropouts and
poaching of graduates by other employers (about 25% each) concern
them,260 as do too much training time and paperwork (about 10%
each).261
The Industrial Revolution transformed a unitary product market
into separate product, labor, capital, and technology markets.262
Changes in technology both increased and separated labor and capital
productivity263 and changed production functions (the way in which
firms combine the factors of production). Technology’s march forward
made capital much more expensive, even as it made it more produc-
tive,264 thus increasing economies of scale. When the production func-
tion involved small quantities of capital—a spinning wheel or a hand
loom—many workers had sufficient wealth to make the investment.
They could combine their labor with raw material using that capital
and sell the resulting product directly to customers. When technology
gave birth to the spinning jenny and the power loom, capitalists had to
amass the capital to buy or build machinery and the land to house it.
258. LERMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 26 tbl.8.1 (reporting that 14% relied on one-stop
centers, 66% on current employees, and 41% on community college or technical
school).
259. Id. at 16–19 (reporting that apprenticeship sponsors—mostly employers—found
large benefits from the programs). But see id. at 20 (admitting that sponsors que-
ried in the study were likely to find programs beneficial because otherwise they
would not sponsor them).
260. Id. at 20 tbl.6.1. Sponsors identified “personal issues” such as “family needs,
mental health or substance abuse problems, physical illnesses, and legal issues”
as the most common reason for dropping out (36%). Id. at 23.
261. Id. at 20 tbl.6.1.
262. Shmoop Editorial Team, Factors of Production, SHMOOP, https://www.shmoop.
com/economic-principles/factors-production.html [https://perma.unl.edu/W4VD-
T2AY] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (“Many economists also identify a fourth factor
of production: technology.”). Frances Cabot Lowell’s mill enterprise separated
capital from labor. See ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at 211–12 (discussing Fran-
ces Cabot Lowell’s practice of employing young women and investing in “labor-
saving machines”). When almost all work was performed at home, work was
fused with the capital it used—a mule, a plow, a spinning wheel, a blacksmith
forge, or a printing press. Even modestly successful households could mobilize
the necessary capital. No labor market existed separate from the product market
because entrepreneurs did their own work, sometimes with the aid of members of
their households. No capital market existed because, for the most part, not much
capital was required, and not much existed because the surplus was small. From
the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries, markets gradually expanded in geo-
graphic scope, allowing more economic activity to move out of the household into
the market.
263. Labor productivity is the quantity of output producible by a unit of labor, all
other things being held constant.
264. The “minimum efficient scale,” increased as a result. Minimum efficient scale is
the smallest plant that can be profitable, given capital costs and demand.
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As a result, they took on the responsibility of combining the factors of
production into a product for the consumer.265 Workers now worked,
not for the ultimate customer, but for a firm. Product markets and
labor markets became distinct.
Separation of labor, capital, land, and technology freed up each to
move separately. Capital was the most mobile. Labor, though as mo-
bile as capital in economists’ simple models, was in fact far less mo-
bile. Cultural and language differences, along with a desire to keep
the familiar within easy reach, make workers reluctant to relocate.
Technology’s inherent mobility resisted efforts to isolate it,266 al-
though patent systems restrict its mobility.267
Capital mobility repeatedly reshaped the textile industry. At the
beginning of industrialization, Frances Cabot Lowell moved capital
that had been employed in ocean shipping and merchant trading into
the first textile mills.268 Capital moved to the South from the 1880s to
the 1930s269 and then overseas for the balance of the twentieth cen-
tury. Every business school student learns how to assess alternatives
for capital investment by estimating the return on invested capital for
each. When the New England textile manufacturers looked at the
South in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, they saw lower
labor costs, lower regulatory costs, and lower transportation costs for
raw material, offset somewhat by higher transportation cost for ship-
ping their finished product to markets in the Northeast and Midwest.
Higher returns on investing in the latest technologies were available
in Gadsden, Alabama, than in Chicopee, Massachusetts. Capitalists
made new capital investments in the South rather than in New En-
gland, and they did not replace capital already invested in their New
England plants as the machinery wore out. The workers, however, did
not follow the capital; they stayed in New England.
265. Francis Cabot Lowell was a member of one of the wealthiest families in New
England, but he had to invent a corporation as a business form to pool capital
from other individuals and families to build his first mill. He was an innovator in
finance as well as in industrial production. See ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at
231–37 (describing Lowell’s efforts to finance Boston Manufacturing Company,
including formation of a “joint stock company”).
266. See id. at 178 (reporting Lowell’s determination to learn British industrial
secrets); id. at 206 (reporting Samuel Slater’s evasion of the “British ban on the
emigration of skilled artisans”).
267. See Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 599 (1881) (holding that a patent for car-
pet loom improvement was infringed); Mason v. Graham, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 261,
277 (1874) (revising a damages award for infringement of patent on loom picker-
staff mechanism); Allen Pusey, The Sewing Machine Patent War, 101 A.B.A. J. 72
(Sept. 2015).
268. ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at 1, 4, 232.
269. MINCHIN, supra note 107, at 31–32 (acknowledging a split in New England textile
interests as substantial numbers of them moved their capital to the South).
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The same thing happened fifty years later as textile capitalists
evaluated the opportunities in Asia. While training costs might be
higher in Asia, because the available labor force was unskilled, tech-
nology had advanced to the point that skill was less necessary. Regu-
latory costs over the long run might be higher than in the South,
because of political instability and uncertainty over the viability of
capitalism, but much lower wage rates, the possibility of starting with
fresh technology, and lower shipping rates for sending finished cloth
in shipping containers tipped the scales decisively toward investing in
Asia. Trade barriers were being lowered, allowing entry into American
and European markets at competitive prices. Once again, the workers
did not follow the capital.
In the simpleminded economist’s model of labor markets, a textile
plant operative who lost his job when JP Stevens liquidated and
closed its North Carolina plant would have moved to Bangladesh to
seek work in the rapidly growing industry there. That did not happen
to any significant degree. An engineer might have moved from North
Carolina to Bangladesh, and a few executives along with him, but not
the main workforce.
Labor immobility as a cause of labor market adjustment friction
plays a more prominent role now than it did in earlier periods. In the
first fifty years of the American Industrial Revolution, as section V.A
points out, going west to acquire land and start a farm was a common
aspiration which induced many young men just entering the
workforce to go west. That form of labor mobility was attractive, com-
mon, and relieved pressure when industrial employment opportuni-
ties diminished. For the second half of the Industrial Revolution—the
period running roughly from the Civil War to the turn of the twentieth
century—labor mobility operated differently. It was immigrants from
Europe who were mobile, following the capital invested in expansion
of textile production in the United States. Section IV.B describes mill
owner and governmental efforts to recruit immigrants. In the South,
workers moved off the farm and into the mills as the mill owners
worked to make the mills attractive alternatives.270 Mobility between
jobs in different mills within the same region was common, both in
New England271 and in the South. But, labor was unwilling to follow
270. See MCHUGH, supra note 203, at 18–19 (stating mill owners used housing, good
living conditions, and schools to attract workforce from farms); id. at 59–61 (stat-
ing mill owners built good schools to attract a high-quality workforce); id. at 61
(stating schools increased monopsony power by reducing mobility); id. at 94–95
(explaining that the differences between labor markets in the South and New
England started with the impoverished nature of the Southern farm sector).
271. See Costello, supra note 157, at 165, 170 (1990) (describing looking for mill work
in different places); Albert Cote, I Learned It Myself as I Went Along, in THE LAST
GENERATION, supra note 23, at 186, 190 (describing work in different mills during
strikes); Harry Dickenson, That’s What They Used to Call Them: Mill Rats, in
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capital South, and then it was unwilling or unable to follow it to
Asia.272
Timothy Minchin’s Empty Mills273 tells the story of creative de-
struction in the New England textile industry as production moved
south. Even if they complained about their work environment, work-
ers had become emotionally attached to their jobs and employers.274
They did not want to work anywhere except in the mills that now were
closing.275 Textile work was embedded in their communities—more
than that, it defined their communities; when the textile plant closed,
the town had no more reason to exist.276 Workers were unwilling to
move to seek new jobs,277 and they had little interest in retraining to
work in jobs other than those they had grown up with. Unemployment
rates as high as 50% for older workers persisted for decades after the
Great Depression.278 This reality is completely inconsistent with an
economist’s model of a frictionless labor market, easily adjusting to
change.279
C. Unemployment Compensation
Legislation to cushion spells of unemployment with some kind of
an insurance scheme was not enacted until the 1930s. Talk of a right
to a job, however, had been current much earlier as a part of confused
public discourse over Agrarianism and Marxism. Horace Greeley
talked about a right to a job in 1845, but his advocacy occurred in the
context of debate over liberalizing homesteading law.280 Greeley’s
right to a job was a right to a farm.281
THE LAST GENERATION, supra note 23, at 158, 159–60 (reporting on movements
between mills in Maine, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts).
272. See ENGLISH, supra note 196, at 177–82.
273. MINCHIN, supra note 107.
274. Id. at 30 (describing strong sense of identity from work, fascination with ma-
chines and mills, and close, near familial, bonds with fellow workers).
275. Id. at 29 (indicating “most workers wanted to stay in the mills” and not take jobs
in growth industries).
276. Id. (describing the effect on communities).
277. Id. at 26 (noting reluctance of laid-off workers to move).
278. Id. at 24–29.
279. Christopher Mims, Adding Friction to the Market, KELLOGG INSIGHT (Aug. 1,
2011), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/adding_friction_to_the_
market [https://perma.unl.edu/2TJK-LZ9A] (summarizing problems with a sim-
plified view of frictionless labor markets).
280. John R. Commons, Horace Greeley and the Working Class Origins of the Republi-
can Party, 24 POL. SCI. Q. 468, 481 (Sept. 1909) (quoting Horrace Greely, Edito-
rial, WEEKLY TRIBUNE, Nov. 29 1845, at 5, c. 5) (noting the purpose of homestead
law in “securing to every man, as nearly as may be, a chance to work for and earn
a living”).
281. Id. at 482 (“The freedom of the public lands to actual settlers . . . are also mea-
sures which seem to us vitally necessary to the ultimate emancipation of labor
from thraldom and misery. What is mainly wanted is that each man should have
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Legislative concern over child labor largely pushed unemployment
to the fringes of public policy agendas. Still, the recessions and depres-
sions of 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 reawakened calls for state govern-
ments to be employers of last resort. States responded with various
kinds of public works programs.282 UI suffered the opposition of the
trade union movement, which was concerned that it would tie workers
to particular employers and weaken trade unions.283 If a craft worker
lost his job, he had to resort to the union hall to find another one; if he
was covered by UI, he could ignore the union and wait to be recalled.
Others argued that a British-style “dole” system would demoralize
workers and erode their character.284
The public discourse continued into the twentieth century, with ad-
vocates of public works jobs gradually losing ground to claims that
such programs interfered unduly with markets. State proposals for UI
began to proliferate after the turn of the twentieth century, but none
were enacted, primarily because of fears that any enacting state
would lose industry and jobs to other states.285 Stimulated by an ava-
lanche of proposals in the wake of the worsening Great Depression,
the basic contours of UI had emerged by 1932. First, Wisconsin,286
followed by Ohio, adopted somewhat different programs.287 The differ-
ences between the two approaches lie behind the collaborative federal-
state nature of the existing system. According to the executive secre-
tary of the committee President Roosevelt appointed to draft federal
legislation, the committee members adopted a cooperative federal-
state system because they could not agree on the content of a purely
federal system. Further, they also wanted the federal government to
prescribe the rate of the payroll tax to support it and to collect the tax
to eliminate interstate competition.288
an assured chance to earn, and then an assurance of the just fruits of his la-
bors. . . . Every new labor-saving invention is a new argument, an added neces-
sity for it.”).
282. Bortz, supra note 257.
283. Id. (noting American Federation of Labor opposition).
284. Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21,
23–25 (1945) (noting opposition by President Harding and then-Secretary of
Commerce Hoover).
285. Edwin E. Witte, An Historical Account of Unemployment Insurance in the Social
Security Act, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 157–58 (1936). Professor Witte was
Executive Director of President Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security and
participated in drafting the federal legislation. Id. at 157 n.*.
286. Bortz, supra note 257 (describing Wisconsin’s “Groves Act”); see also Charity Ver-
sus Social Insurance in Unemployment Compensation Laws, 73 YALE L.J. 357,
358 n.12 (1963) (describing history of unemployment insurance system).
287. Id. (describing differences between Wisconsin’s individual employer rating sys-
tem and Ohio’s pooled contribution system).
288. Witte, supra note 285, at 163.
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In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,289 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of Alabama’s Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act on the grounds that relieving unemployment is a permissible
purpose for taxation.290
The current joint federal–state UI system begins with a federal tax
of 6% on total wages.291 Employers are entitled to a credit against this
tax for payments made under state law.292 The federal government
also makes grants to states for unemployment compensation adminis-
tration and can advance funds to state programs in financial dis-
tress.293 States have considerable latitude in designing their own
programs,294 although the federal statute conditions receipt of federal
funds on state plans’ having certain characteristics.295
Benefits are limited to statutory employees.296 Employee is de-
fined as “any individual who, under the usual common law rules appli-
cable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the
status of an employee.”297 The federal statute also allows UI pay-
ments under state law for “assisting such individuals in establishing a
business and becoming self-employed.”298
289. 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
290. Id. at 515–18.
291. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
292. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3302 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
293. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501–506 (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (addressing grants to states for un-
employment compensation administration); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1324 (2012) (ad-
dressing advances to state unemployment funds).
294. See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301–3311 (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
295. See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(10) (conditioning federal payment to states on administra-
tion of recipient profiling program); 42 U.S.C. § 503(j)(1) (requiring profiling of
unemployment insurance recipients to determine needs for re-employment assis-
tance). States may not deny unemployment benefits to individuals for refusing to
accept a job vacant because of a strike or lockout. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5)(A).
States may not deny unemployment for refusing to accept a job that pays less
than prevailing wages. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5)(B). States may not deny compensa-
tion to individuals because they are in state-approved training programs. 26
U.S.C. § 3304(a)(8).
296. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i). In addition, these include positions such “as an agent-driver
or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable products,
fruit products, bakery products, beverages (other than milk), or laundry or dry-
cleaning services, for his principal” and “as a home worker performing work, ac-
cording to specifications furnished by the person for whom the services are per-
formed, on materials or goods furnished by such person which are required to be
returned to such person or a person designated by him.” 26 U.S.C.
§ 3121(d)(3)(A), (C).
297. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) (2012).
298. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(t).
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The Illinois system is typical of state systems, although it is more
generous than some others.299 Illinois limits benefits to twenty-six
weeks,300 except for certain exhaustees.301 Illinois further limits com-
pensation to those who have “registered for work,” and are “available
for work.”302 Illinois, like most other states, cooperates in administer-
ing claims crossing state lines.303 An employee with Illinois work
credits who lives outside Illinois may file for benefits either in Illinois
or their state of residence.304
Under most state statutes, unemployment benefits are available to
claimants to move to other states to seek work,305 at least when job
prospects are good in the place to which a claimant moves.306 Most of
the relevant caselaw involves claimants who are denied benefits be-
299. The Illinois statute decreased the amount of UI benefits from 48% of the prior
weekly average wage to 40.3% of the prior weekly average wage between 2008 to
2018. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/401(B) (West 2019).
300. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/403 (West 2019).
301. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/508.5, 405/409 (West 2019).
302. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/500 (West 2019). “An individual shall be deemed
unavailable for work if, after his separation from his most recent employing unit,
he has removed himself to and remains in a locality where opportunities for work
are substantially less favorable than those in the locality he has left.” 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/500(c)(3) (West 2019). “In determining whether or not any
work is suitable for an individual, consideration shall be given to the degree of
risk involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior
training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and
prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of
the available work from his residence.” ILL. DEP’T OF EMP’T SEC., ILLINOIS UNEM-
PLOYMENT INSURANCE LAW HANDBOOK G- 51 (2019), http://www.ides.illinois.gov/
IDES%20Forms%20and%20Publications/CLI106L.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
HDZ8-WFVK].
303. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(9)(A) authorizes the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan. Illinois
authorized participation in § 409J of the Unemployment Insurance Act. See 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2700(A)–(B). ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, §§ 2714.200–225 con-
tains the rules for administration of the program. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56,
§§ 2714.200–225 (LexisNexis 2019); accord ILL. DEP’T OF EMP’T SEC., supra note
302, at R-20–R-21.
304. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, § 2720.155 (LexisNexis 2019).
305. See, e.g., Fondu v. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, No. CV1550149914S, 2015
WL 7709361 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2015) (stating the general rule that a
claimant may be entitled to benefits when he relocates to another state and seeks
work there).
306. Compare id. (affirming a decision that a web designer who moved to Spain was
not actively seeking work there when he spoke no Spanish and directed most of
his job seeking efforts to the United States) and Fiedler v. Metro. Prods. Inc., No.
A09-1257, 2010 WL 1968782, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 18, 2010) (“The record is
void of any evidence that relator needed to travel to Spain in order to pursue his
employment search.”) with Rios v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, 231 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (reversing denial of benefits to migrant farm workers who re-
turned to homes in Texas where finding work was marginally less likely; they
nevertheless were seeking work, as required; however, relative probability of
finding work is not the test).
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cause they moved from places of greater employment opportunity to
places of less opportunity.307
On the other hand, states generally do not require claimants to
move to seek job opportunities in other labor markets. In Hanshew v.
Employment Dep’t,308 the court reversed the appeals board and held
that an applicant may qualify for benefits even though the applicant is
incapable of traveling to a part of the labor market that is twenty-four
miles away.309
VI. REALISTIC POLICY DIRECTIONS
The question naturally arises: If government sponsored and de-
signed job training programs do not work, how should elected officials
and candidates for public office respond to the inevitable public outcry
that the government should do something to cushion the hardship of
job losses occasioned by creative destruction?
Three answers are plausible. First, the government should pursue
macroeconomic policies that are most likely to lead to sustainable
growth. The political compulsion to do this exists anyway, and policy
leaders should recognize that sound economic growth and the embrace
of new industries and technologies is the best guarantor of job
opportunities.
Second, the government should recognize that the unemployment
compensation system is the only labor market policy that has consist-
ently produced proof of good results. The government should reform
the unemployment compensation system to provide additional incen-
tives for displaced workers to adjust by becoming more mobile.
Third, the government should recognize that the best path to good
job opportunities is a solid education on fundamental job skills: a facil-
ity with reading, writing, and basic calculation, reinforced by basic lit-
eracy in computer and network technology. A solid work ethic that
307. See Yadro v. Bowling, 414 N.E.2d 1244, 1246–47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (affirming
the denial of benefits for an applicant who moved from a labor market with con-
siderable job opportunities to one with significantly fewer); accord Lind v. Emp’t
Sec. Div., Dep’t of Labor, 608 P.2d 6, 8 (Alaska 1980) (affirming the denial of
benefits to a claimant who “moved from an area in which her services were in
demand to a place ‘where work is nearly non-existent in her profession’”); In re
Claim of Montes, 561 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (affirming the de-
nial of benefits to a claimant who moved from a normal labor market area to a
place of limited job opportunities); cf. Plzybylowicz v. Commonwealth Unemploy-
ment Comp. Bd. of Review, 546 A.2d 1332, 1333 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (af-
firming the denial of benefits to a claimant who moved away from the place
where he claimed he was seeking work).
308. 214 P.3d 833 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
309. Id.; see also ILL. DEP’T OF EMP’T SEC., supra note 302, at AA-257 (holding that a
Peoria claimant who said she would accept work within fifteen to twenty miles
from her home was not required by the able and available requirement to accept
work at a greater distance).
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comes naturally from involvement in a rigorous educational program
is as important as these technical capabilities.
This training should occur in high schools. No one should graduate
from high school without being able to read, write, and perform arith-
metic calculations at the level necessary for most jobs. Regrettably,
this is not the case presently. Ideally, reform of job-training would be-
gin with high schools and community colleges. The barriers to change
are great, however. They include an abandonment of the rigor neces-
sary for good educational achievement in the face of parental and com-
munity pressure to retain everyone and eventually to graduate them.
Teachers’ union boards and educational bureaucracies, reinforced by
community control of schools have made reform daunting by elevating
the goal of diversity over educational achievement.310
The community college system has always been beset by confusion
over its mission: whether it is meant to be a system of trade schools or
college prep schools; whether its main task is remedial education for
those the high school system has failed; or something else.311 Moreo-
ver, most community college systems are encumbered by bureaucra-
cies as intricate and thoughtless as those paralyzing public education.
Last, charter schools and for-profit educational institutions can
jump into the breach. But it has become clear that neither of them is a
magic bullet. Charter schools are under attack all over the country.
Scandals and shutdowns of for-profit schools proliferate and shape a
major part of the debate federal education policy.
A. Restructure the Unemployment Compensation System to
Provide Incentives to Relocate to Find Work
One very large target for reform is inextricably linked with labor
markets: the UI system.312 Expenditures on unemployment benefits
310. See Elizabeth A. Harris, De Blasio Proposes Changes to New York’s Elite High
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/02/nyre-
gion/de-blasio-new-york-schools.html?module=inline [https://perma.unl.edu/
68HH-Z9J2] (reporting on New York mayor’s proposal to eliminate admissions
test to make magnet schools more diverse ethnically).
311. See Kevin J. Dougherty et al., Reforming the American Community College:
Promising Changes and Their Challenges 1 (Cmty. Coll. Research Ctr., Working
Paper No. 98, 2017), https://ccrc.tc.columbia.edu/media/k2/attachments/re-
forming-american-community-college-promising-changes-challenges.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/VX7E-XGDJ] (noting the multiple goals of the community college
system).
312. Other social benefits are targets for improvement as well. Any form of govern-
ment subsidy for someone who is unemployed and seeking work, or out of the
labor market, represents a disincentive to work to earn income. Workers, like
capitalists, calculate opportunity cost and marginal return. They may not do it
quantitatively and explicitly, but they do it instinctively. Long-term unemploy-
ment assistance and overly generous disability insurance payments retard job
seeking. See Ben Casselman, Why Some Scars from the Recession May Never
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were about $100 billion per year for the first five years of the Great
Recession.313 Yet the system is remarkably unchanged from its initial
implementation in 1936.314 Far more energetic and imaginative policy
development is needed to reshape the system for the needs of the
twenty-first century. The most important goal is to reform the system
to increase labor mobility.
The evidence is clear that the unemployment rate is significantly
higher among less educated members of the labor force.315 It is also
Vanish, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/business/
economy/recession-recovery.html [https://perma.unl.edu/QLH7-YDRT] (noting
high and increasing levels of people drawing disability payments as one possible
explanation for adult males dropping out of the labor force).
Disability programs that allow payment to persons disqualified only from a
particular industry or particular jobs should be disfavored in this regard, and
disability programs generally should allow payments only for applicants who are
disqualified from the full range of jobs in the economy, specifically including
those that can be performed remotely. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN
§ 421.28(c) (Westlaw 2019 Pub. Acts 151) (allowing unemployment benefits only
for those willing to accept “suitable full-time work of a character that the individ-
ual is qualified to perform by past experience or training, which is of a character
generally similar to work for which the individual has previously received wages,
and for which the individual is available, full time, either at a locality at which
the individual earned wages for insured work during his or her base period or at
a locality where it is found by the unemployment agency that such work is availa-
ble.”), and Jones-Jennings v. Hutzel Hosp., 565 N.W.2d 680, 686 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997), with 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (2019) (listing disabled persons as eligible for SSI
benefits), and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 416.260 (providing for extra benefits for those
who work despite a disabling condition), and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 416.905 (defin-
ing disability as “severe impairment(s) that makes you unable to do your past
relevant work (see § 416.960(b)) or any other substantial gainful work that exists
in the national economy”); compare Johnson v. Colvin, 204 F. Supp. 3d 396, 408
(D. Mass. 2016) (affirming the denial of disability benefits while reviewing, in
detail, evidence about claimant who suffered from a variety of generalized com-
plaints and who systematically resisted medical advice and rehabilitative treat-
ments but who was able to perform some jobs that existed in significant numbers
in the local and national economy), with Thomas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 294 F.3d
568, 572–73 (3d Cir. 2002) (reversing finding of no disability and holding that
Social Security Administration should have considered that former job—that of
elevator operator—was obsolete), rev’d sub nom. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S.
20, 26 (2003) (stating that an agency need not consider whether previous job ex-
isted in significant numbers, only other jobs existed in the national economy).
The platform economy, crowdsourcing, and working from home all expand the
range of occupations that a person with a certain level of disability can perform
acceptably.
313. Tami Luhby, Unemployment Benefits Cost: $520 Billion, CNN MONEY (Nov. 29,
2012, 1:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/29/news/economy/unemployment-
benefits-cost/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9G2E-CY8Y].
314. See supra section V.C.
315. Dennis Vilorio, Data on Display: Education Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BU-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/
data-on-display/education-matters.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/NUA8-TEF7]
(showing a dramatic relationship between education level and unemployment).
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clear that less educated members of the workforce are not as likely to
relocate to find a job. Why education correlates with mobility is a mat-
ter only of speculation. It is possible that lesser educated workers have
stronger ties to extended families, local labor unions, and local social
organizations that reinforce their safety net.316 It is also possible that
their lack of education leaves them with a weaker understanding of
the larger world and its social and economic forces, making relocation
inherently more frightening.
In any event, immobility impairs the economy’s ability to adjust to
creative destruction and its effects on workers. Labor market policy
should try to do something to increase mobility. The policy will be bet-
ter defined if it is backed up by more robust empirical evidence about
causation than is available now.
Some employers are willing to cover relocation costs for new
hires,317 and proposals are beginning to emerge for incentives to relo-
cate as a part of the unemployment compensation system. In 2016, the
Obama Administration proposed to incentivize states to offer reloca-
tion vouchers.318 The American Worker Mobility Act,319 sponsored by
Representatives Tony Cardenas (D. CA) and Mick Mulvaney (R. SC),
would authorize the Secretary of Labor to grant relocation subsidies to
UI recipients who have exhausted their benefits.320 The grants would
be available to workers who want to move more than sixty miles from
their current residences for accepting “a bona fide offer of suitable em-
ployment affording a reasonable expectation of long-term duration in
the area in which the individual wishes to relocate”321 or who “[wish]
to relocate to an area that has an unemployment rate that is at least 2
percentage points less than the unemployment rate of the area of the
316. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169 (2012) (pro-
viding an awkwardly written overview of forces at work in decisions to relocate
that emphasizes social costs).
317. See Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Employers Willing to Pay to Relocate Employ-
ees, SHRM (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/
compensation/pages/relocationpay.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/K7X5-A5EJ] (re-
porting on a survey showing that thirty-two percent of employers would be will-
ing to pay relocation benefits to new employees).
318. The Administration’s proposal would also: subsidize employment and career
counseling programs to unemployed workers; allow displaced workers making
less than $50,000 to replace half of their lost wages, up to $10,000 over two years;
allow states to extend benefits to part-time, low-income and intermittent workers
who can’t already take advantage of the out-of-work programs; and mandate
states to provide at least twenty-six weeks of coverage for those looking for work.
See Bradford Richardson, Obama Unveils Plan to Reform Unemployment Insur-
ance, THE HILL (Jan. 16, 2016, 06:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/266134-obama-unveils-plan-to-reform-unemployment-insurance
[https://perma.unl.edu/Z6NF-PRYB].
319. H.R. 4033, 113th Cong. (2014), reintroduced as H.R. 2755, 114th Cong. (2015).
320. H.R. 4033 § 2(b).
321. Id. § 2(c)(3)(A).
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individual’s initial residence.”322 The grants would be capped at
$10,000 and could include up to 90% of relocation expenses plus three
times the beneficiary’s weekly unemployment benefit.323
One Berkeley economist, Enrico Moretti, points out that every un-
employed worker who remains in an area where there are not enough
jobs for all the job seekers imposes an externality on all the other job
seekers.324 The relocation payments could be layered on top of normal
UI benefits, or the funds could be part of the current payments pool,
with job seekers who remain in place being paid lower benefits.325 A
University of Southern California economist, Andrii Parkhomenko,
concludes that that a relocation subsidy in the form of a voucher for
moving expenses during the Great Recession would have reduced un-
employment by 4.8% and increased national productivity by 1%.326
The magnitude of the effect is modest, however, suggesting that re-
formers should seek more aggressive incentives.
The most obvious possibility is the one suggested briefly, almost
parenthetically, by both Moretti and Parkhomenko, and embraced by
New York Times columnist David Brooks:327 divert a portion of the
existing unemployment benefits to those who relocate to more promis-
ing labor markets. As they point out, this diversion could be in the
form of supplementary benefits, or it could be in the form of reduced
benefits for those who do not relocate. It is far from clear, as House
Resolution 2755 provides,328 that the relocation incentive should
await expiration of normal twenty-six-week unemployment benefits. If
incentives to search remote labor markets are desirable, they are as
desirable at the onset of unemployment as after six months.
Despite widespread concern about unemployment resulting from
the Great Recession of 2008, proposals to reform the UI system have
been modest in scope and imagination. The Secretary of Labor must
322. Id. § 2(c)(3)(B).
323. H.R. 2755 § 2(d).
324. See ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 161–64 (2012) (explaining
and arguing for relocation vouchers to ease structural unemployment); Enrico
Moretti, Unemployment Benefits Should Encourage Geographic Mobility, WASH.
POST: OPINIONS (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/unem-
ployment-benefits-should-encourage-geographic-mobility/2013/04/12/c84880be-
a382-11e2-82bc-511538ae90a4_story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9TD9-RZYV]
(same; noting that Trade Adjustment Assistance program already provides relo-
cation assistance).
325. See supra note 324.
326. See Andrii Parkhomenko, Opportunity to Move: Macroeconomic Effects of Reloca-
tion Subsidies (Nov. 24, 2016), bit.ly/2PAll3I [https://perma.unl.edu/4Q3D-
DNQ5] (reporting econometric analysis).
327. See David Brooks, The Workers Paradise, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/opinion/republicans-taxes-voters.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/5BFJ-P6HS] (arguing for mobility vouchers for the unemployed).
328. H.R. 2755, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(1), (2) (2015).
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assure the availability of “reemployment services” and other pre-req-
uisites for receiving unemployment compensation.329 The Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014,330 among other things, re-
quires states to submit four-year strategic plans for workforce devel-
opment as a precondition of receiving federal funding.331
On the right, the Heritage Foundation proposes to reduce the over-
all tax burden, eliminate the federal–state divided responsibility, give
full responsibility to the states with federal funding, and reject pro-
posals to expand UI to cover family and pregnancy leave.332 Further,
the American Enterprise Institute opposed Obama Administration
proposals to extend benefits to seventy-three weeks and urged more
emphasis on “helping people relocate to find work or offering more as-
sistance with job retraining . . . and addressing the serious skills gap
for those with less than a college degree.”333
Even some left-of-center think tanks, such as the Center for Equi-
table Growth, acknowledge that extending benefits longer is not help-
ful for re-employment.334 The Center for American Progress proposes
to:
• bolster re-employment services to connect more jobseekers with
workforce development opportunities;
• strengthen tools such as work sharing that help workers stay in
the jobs that they already have;
• expand UI eligibility to reach more unemployed workers;
• improve the adequacy of UI benefits; and increase participation
in the program;
• reform UI inancing to assure solvency; and
• repair the Extended Benefits program.
It recommends establishment of a new Jobseeker’s Allowance for
workers who would remain ineligible for UI, such as unemployed inde-
pendent contractors and those with limited work history.335
329. 29 U.S.C. § 49b(c)(3) (2012).
330. 29 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3361 (Supp. V 2018).
331. 29 U.S.C. § 3112.
332. Unemployment Compensation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human
Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 64–67 (2000) (statement
of Mark Wilson, Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation).
333. Alex Brill, Extended Unemployment Benefits: Not What the Labor Market Needs,
AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.aei.org/publication/extended-
unemployment-benefits-not-what-the-labor-market-needs/ [https://perma.unl.
edu/DML5-VGAJ].
334. See Till von Wachter, Unemployment Insurance Reform: A Primer, WASH. CTR.
FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Oct. 31, 2016), https://equitablegrowth.org/unemploy-
ment-insurance-reform-primer/ [https://perma.unl.edu/F7EZ-JNGH] (“Although
the evidence is mixed, an ongoing concern is UI may damage reemployment pros-
pects by lengthening the unemployment spell.”).
335. See Rachel West et al., Strengthening Unemployment Protections in America,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 16, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.americanpro-
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This Article makes the point several times that engineering labor
markets precisely is impossible in a market economy and is unlikely to
be successful, even in a planned economy. Designers and advocates of
relocation incentives must be thoughtful and articulate about the fol-
lowing considerations that shape policy:
• High unemployment in one region may be cyclical instead of
structural; it makes the most sense for those unable to find jobs
in such areas to remain there until the local economy improves
rather than experiencing the disruption of moving elsewhere.
• The signals for looser or tighter labor markets are crude and
are mainly limited to state-level and metropolitan-area unem-
ployment rates.
• The exact amount of a relocation bonus necessary to induce sig-
nificant incentives to relocate is uncertain, but it is reasonable
to predict that larger economic incentives will have a greater
effect.
To be effective, a practical and relatively simple administrative appa-
ratus must administer any relocation incentive system; a system pur-
porting to micromanage every worker’s job search is doomed to fail.
The starting point should be an applicant’s representation or certifica-
tion, just like under virtually all UI systems for conventional benefits,
so that a benefit applicant who certifies that he has or is about to relo-
cate to another labor market area is presumptively entitled to a relo-
cation benefit. H.R. 2775 does not make it clear whether the
applicant’s representation creates a presumption, or whether the Sec-
retary of Labor must take the initiative in making a finding.336
Then, if there is reason to doubt the representation, the fact of relo-
cation or failure to relocate is quite easy to establish. The burden of
proof should be placed on the applicant to show that he has, in fact,
relocated within a certain period of time after he applies.
B. Target Student Loans and Reform For-Profit Trade
Schools
The enormous federally subsidized student loan program provides
a source of leverage to improve workforce training. Policymakers are
concerned with the magnitude of student loan debt, which may re-
present a bubble that jeopardizes the health of the entire economy,
and with the practices of many schools that misrepresent the job op-
portunities likely to be available to students after completion of the
gress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2016/06/16/138492/strengthening-unemploy
ment-protections-in-america/ [https://perma.unl.edu/3FAF-DEL6].
336. See H.R. 2755, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).
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programs.337 The level of dissatisfaction with the program makes it
politically feasible to modify it and use it as a vehicle for a dramatic
change in U.S. labor market policy.
For-profit trade schools have an important role to play. They are
flexible, as capital mobility makes them nimble. The profit motive pro-
vides an incentive for them to perform in attracting new students and
employers for their graduates. Their reputation, however, is in tatters.
Better accreditation standards and enforcement for these for-profit
trade schools might enable them to realize their potential. Entrepre-
neurs are perfectly suited to fill the job training gap. A need obviously
exists, and trainees, potential employers, and governments are willing
to pay.
For-profit trade schools proliferated at the end of the twentieth
century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, but the public
perception is that they often merely exploit their aspiring students
and do little to prepare them for actual work, let alone to place them
in jobs.338 The allegations in the Corinthian College case highlight the
difficulties that led to student disappointment.339 Such difficulties
and questionable practices are not limited to for-profit institutions.340
A revised regulatory regime would require tight accreditation by
bodies dominated by employers that regularly review hard data about
the schools’ placement rates in new jobs. The current accreditation
regulations themselves are almost completely silent on placement of
graduates in jobs.341
337. See Stacy Cowley, DeVos Toughens Rules for Student Borrowers Bilked by Col-
leges, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/business/
betsy-devos-student-loan-forgiveness.html [https://perma.unl.edu/435X-F8YN]
(reviewing controversy over loan cancellation for students disappointed by
schools which closed, stranding students).
338. The California Attorney General’s lawsuit against Corinthian Colleges is repre-
sentative of the alleged instances of market failure. See Complaint, People v.
Heald College, LLC, No. CGC-13-534793 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 13, 2013)
[hereinafter Heald Complaint], 2013 CA Sup. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 14368, at
*1–4; Press Release, Kamala Harris, Attorney Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attor-
ney General Kamala D. Harris Files Suit in Alleged For-Profit College Predatory
Scheme (Oct. 10, 2013), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-
kamala-d-harris-files-suit-alleged-profit-college-predatory [https://perma.unl.edu
/2QZG-N72X].
339. See Heald Complaint, supra note 338, ¶ 3 (discussing internal Corinthian docu-
ments about characteristics of target population).
340. See Elie Mystal, Villanova Law ‘Knowingly Reported’ Inaccurate Information to
the ABA, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:34 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2011/02/
villanova-law-school-knowingly-reported-inaccurate-information-to-the-aba/
[https://perma.unl.edu/L5KG-YAB5]; David Lat, In Defense of Law Schools Hir-
ing Their Own Graduates, ABOVE THE L. (Mar. 28, 2013, 6:06 PM), https://
abovethelaw.com/2013/03/in-defense-of-law-schools-hiring-their-own-graduates/
[https://perma.unl.edu/F5HM-Z2XT].
341. The Accrediting Commission of Career Schools and Colleges (ACCSC) Standards
of Accreditation has a two-sentence section on graduate placement assistance.
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The risk of industry capture is less than it might be in the profes-
sions and traditional trades where practitioners have incentives to
limit the supply of new entrants. The training programs considered in
this Article supply workers for enterprises that want to increase the
supply of qualified workers and, thus, experience less risk of industry
capture.
C. Resuscitate the Apprenticeship Concept.
Replace “Registered Apprenticeships” with simplified apprentice-
ship incentives. The existing system protects the job and wage levels
of those in declining industries without doing anything to facilitate
transition to alternatives. The Trump Administration’s proposal for
“Industry-Recognized Apprenticeship Programs”342 has gone part of
the way by avoiding the bureaucratic impediments to registered ap-
prenticeships. It eliminates the need to obtain government approval in
advance for apprenticeships. It offers greater flexibility and ways of
tying apprenticeship requirements more closely with actual labor
market demands. It is weak on incentives, however.
The Trump Administration’s proposal recognizes the need to
spread the apprenticeship concept to new industries. Part of what is
needed is an incentive structure for employers to invest in apprentice-
ships. The Trump Administration’s proposal stops short of that. A
more robust reform would provide an incentive for employers to offer
apprenticeships by allowing a one-year training subminimum wage of
60% of the minimum wage. As an alternative, employers would be
privileged to pay a training subminimum wage only when the DOL
has certified the occupation as having a labor shortage. Employers
could create apprenticeships even without any kind of precertification.
The presumption is that, if a job is not already on the occupational list,
it is presumptively one in which labor shortages exist. The burden
should be on the employers to establish the existence of a bona-fide
apprenticeship program when they are subjected to enforcement ac-
tion by the DOL Wage and Hour Division.
The timing for this initiative is right as governments at all levels
consider increasing the minimum wage. Absent the availability of
such a subminimum as discussed above, the effect of increases in the
ACCREDITING COMM’N OF CAREER SCH. AND COLL., STANDARDS OF ACCREDITATION
98 (2017), http://www.accsc.org/UploadedDocuments/1971/ACCSC%20Standards
%20of%20Accreditation%20and%20Bylaws%20-%20070117%20final.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/HE6E-PXH3]. It does, however, require “processes, policies, and
procedures in the areas of student assessment and achievement and demonstrate
that a high proportion of its students . . . obtain employment in the field for which
trained.” Id. at 99.
342. See supra section III.C.
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minimum wage will be to decrease employer efforts at training
employees.
VII. CONCLUSION
Training is the best adjustment mechanism for labor markets. Yet
most training initiatives have not worked very well.
The textile industry led the Industrial Revolution in the United
States. It has, in the 200 years since, repeatedly demonstrated the
workings of creative destruction—a market-rooted process in which
innovations in technology displace old enterprises and the employees
that work for them. The workers’ struggles to find their places in the
redefined technological and industrial order drive politics. Govern-
ments spend $100 billion annually on paying unemployment benefits.
By providing incentives for workers to relocate to where the jobs are,
the UI program can make labor markets function more effectively.
Government registered apprentices might have a role to play, but
only if the current apprenticeship programs change to encourage,
rather than discourage, apprenticeships. The Trump proposal for In-
dustry-Recognized Apprenticeship Programs is a modest contribution
in that regard.
